United Nations S/2003/312

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 March 2003

Original: English

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions and statements pertaining to the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the requirements contained therein, including in particular resolution 1434 (2002) of 6 September 2002,

Further reaffirming its unwavering support for the peace process and its commitment, including through the role played by the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) in the implementation of its mandate, to the full and expeditious implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the parties on 12 December 2000 and the preceding Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities of 18 June 2000 (S/2000/1183 and S/2000/601, respectively, hereinafter referred to as the "Algiers Agreements"), the Delimitation Decision by the Boundary Commission of 13 April 2002 (S/2002/423) embraced by the parties as final and binding in accordance with the Algiers Agreements, including the Orders issued on 17 July 2002 (S/2002/853), and the ensuing binding Demarcation Directions,

Commending the Governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea on the progress made thus far in the peace process, including the recently concluded release and repatriation of prisoners of war, and *calling on* both parties to cooperate with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to clarify and to resolve the remaining issues in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, and with the commitments made in the Algiers Agreements,

Reiterating the need for both parties to fulfil their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law, and to ensure the safety of all personnel of the United Nations, the Boundary Commission, the ICRC and other humanitarian organizations,

Noting that the peace process is about to enter its crucial phase of demarcation, and *emphasizing* the importance of ensuring expeditious implementation of the Boundary Decision while maintaining stability in all areas affected by the decision,

Stressing that only the full implementation of the Algiers Agreements will lead to sustainable peace which is a crucial precondition to address reconstruction and development needs as well as economic recovery,

Noting with concern the continued violations of the model status of forces agreement, which Ethiopia has signed and Eritrea has agreed to respect,

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Welcoming the eighth report of the Boundary Commission, *noting the concerns* expressed therein with regard to full adherence by the parties to the Boundary Decision and demarcation-related decisions of the Commission, and *expressing* its full support for the work of the Commission and the legal framework within which the Commission is taking its decisions,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General (S/2003/257),

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNMEE at the troop and military observer levels authorized by its resolution 1320 (2000) until 15 September 2003;

2. *Urges* both Ethiopia and Eritrea to continue to assume their responsibilities and fulfil their commitments under the Algiers Agreements and *calls upon* them to cooperate fully and promptly with the Boundary Commission to enable it to fulfil the mandate conferred upon it by the parties of expeditiously delimiting and demarcating the boundary, to implement fully the Commission's binding Demarcation Directions, to abide promptly by all its Orders, including those issued on 17 July 2002 (S/2002/853), and to take all steps necessary to provide the necessary security on the ground for the staff of the Commission when operating in territories under their control;

3. *Expresses* concern regarding recent incidents of incursions across the southern boundary of the Temporary Security Zone and *calls on* both parties to ensure an immediate end to such incidents and to cooperate fully with UNMEE investigations in this regard, and expresses further concern about the placement by unknown entities of anti-tank mines in the Temporary Security Zone;

4. *Calls on* the parties to cooperate fully and expeditiously with UNMEE in the implementation of its mandate to ensure the personal security of UNMEE staff when operating in territories under their control, and to facilitate their work, including by establishing a direct high-altitude flight route for UNMEE between Asmara and Addis Ababa, which would relieve the unnecessary additional cost to UNMEE;

5. *Demands* that the parties allow UNMEE full freedom of movement and remove with immediate effect any and all restrictions on, and impediments to the work of, UNMEE and its staff in the discharge of its mandate;

6. *Affirms* the ability of UNMEE, within its existing verification mandate, to monitor the parties' fulfilment of their responsibilities with regard to the security of the Boundary Commission staff working in the field;

7. *Notes* the work done by the UNMEE Mine Action Coordination Centre in demining and education on risk related to mines, and *urges* the parties to pursue efforts on mine clearance;

8. *Urges* the two parties to engage expeditiously in further discussions with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General so that they reach agreement on the timing and modalities of territorial transfer, which could include the establishment by the parties of a mechanism for the resolution of problems in this regard;

9. *Urges* the two parties to begin to sensitize their populations about the demarcation process and its implications, including the role of the United Nations in support of this process;

10. *Calls on* the parties to refrain from unilateral troop or population movements, including establishment of any new settlements in areas near the border, until demarcation and orderly transfer of territorial control has been accomplished, in accordance with article 4.16 of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement;

11. *Reaffirms its decision* to review frequently the progress made by the parties in the implementation of their commitments pursuant to the Algiers Agreements, including through the Boundary Commission, and to review any implications for UNMEE, including with regard to the process of territorial transfers during the demarcation as outlined by the Secretary-General in his report of 10 July 2002;

12. *Encourages* the guarantors, facilitators and witnesses of the Algiers Agreements and the Friends of UNMEE to further intensify their contacts with the authorities of both countries with a view to contributing to an expeditious demarcation process;

13. *Welcomes* the contributions by Member States to the Trust Fund for the Delimitation and Demarcation of the Border and *calls on* the international community to continue to contribute urgently to the Trust Fund in order to facilitate the conclusion of the demarcation process in accordance with the Boundary Commission's schedule;

14. *Calls again* on the parties to increase their efforts to take measures that will build confidence and contribute to the normalization of relations between them, including in particular their political relations and those in the areas listed in paragraph 14 of resolution 1398 (2002) of 15 March 2002;

15. *Expresses its concern* at the prevailing drought and worsening humanitarian situation in Ethiopia and Eritrea and the implications this could have for the peace process and *calls on* Member States to continue to provide prompt and generous support for humanitarian operations in Ethiopia and Eritrea;

16. *Invites* the African Union to continue to lend its full support to the peace process;

17. *Expresses its strong support* for the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, the UNMEE Force Commander, Major General Robert Gordon, the military and civilian personnel of UNMEE and the Boundary Commission for their work in support of the peace process;

18. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

United Nations A/57/754–S/2003/313

General Assembly
Security Council

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13 March 2003
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General Assembly
Fifty-seventh session
Agenda item 33
Causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa

Security Council
Fifty-eighth year

Letter dated 5 March 2003 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Côte d'Ivoire to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the address by the President of the Republic, His Excellency Mr. Laurent Gbagbo, concerning the Marcoussis Agreement on the Ivorian crisis.

I should be grateful if you would have the text in question issued as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 33, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Noël-Emmanuel **Ahipeaud Guebo**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex to the letter dated 5 March 2003 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Côte d'Ivoire to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Ivorian men and women,

My dear compatriots,

Friends living in Côte d'Ivoire,

I am addressing you once again today, as scheduled, to speak of the war, but I hope it will be to speak of the end of the war. Since 19 September 2002 Côte d'Ivoire has, as you know, been unjustly attacked. The aim was to carry out a coup d'état. That coup d'état failed. They installed themselves in Bouaké. And this failed coup d'état was transformed into an armed rebellion. Since then, in order to make peace, in order to obtain peace for my country, I have been going from country to country, from capital to capital; Accra, Dakar, Bamako, Lomé, and then recently Paris. While I was in Paris, after the political parties and the rebel movements had held the Linas-Marcoussis meeting, you rose up in anger. I did not wait five seconds, I came right away, because my place is among the people. When I arrived, I saw this anger. I heard this anger. So I decided to speak to you.

But before speaking to you, I decided to listen to you. I think there is a need to listen, to understand, to analyse, before speaking. That is why, in turn, I assembled all those who constitute the living strength of the nation. I listened to almost everyone. I listened for several days. I analysed, and today, the time has come for me to speak out for Côte d'Ivoire.

I should like to begin by thanking the international community. First, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), our neighbours, our friends — those who are condemned, with us, to live on this piece of earth known as West Africa. From the first days of this crisis, they came to our aid. I thank them for their commitment at our side. I thank them for all these arrangements they have offered for a peaceful settlement of this crisis. In particular, I thank the man who was Chairman of ECOWAS at the time when the crisis came to a head, President Abdoulaye Wade. I thank the man who was the first to approach us to discuss the Ivorian crisis, our neighbour, our friend John Kofuor, who is now current Chairman of ECOWAS. I thank General Gnassingbé Eyadéma, who for more than two months hosted the talks between the government forces and the rebel forces. I thank the European Union, which, through the successive heads of State presiding over it, lent us its support. Recently, at the Paris conference, the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, offered us major assistance if peace was restored. Along with the European Union, I thank France, which, within the European Union, played a vital role, a role of ensuring security on the ground in Côte d'Ivoire and an activist role in Europe and in the world to draw the other industrialized nations' attention to the case of Côte d'Ivoire. Naturally, and lastly, I thank the United Nations and its Secretary-General Kofi Annan, our brother, our neighbour. Since the start of this crisis, he has called me as often as he could. He supports our cause. Wherever we are, he is present or, symbolically, he sends a representative. I am grateful to him for having drawn the attention of the United Nations to the unjust fate that has been ours. The United Nations has already adopted two resolutions. I am grateful for that.

Now, I should like to speak to the people of Côte d'Ivoire, my people. What can I say to you? ... We are together. We are together. I have always known you, and you have always known me. I think that is what some people fail to see. I know you and you know me. I have never betrayed you, I never will betray you. I am aware that you yourselves have never betrayed me ... you accompanied me on my way to Paris with a moving escort. Cries of joy were mingled with tears. From Cocody to the airport, you were massed along the road. When I returned in haste from Paris, after 11 p.m., you were still there, along the road, encouraging me to resist, encouraging me to stand firm. From the airport to Cocody, you were still there. I am grateful to you, for that is the reward for the work we are doing together. This reward is beyond price.

Since 1990, you have continually lent me your warmth and your support. Only God will be able to thank you. In any event, I as a man will do everything I can to deserve your trust always. When I say that I hail the people, I hail the people as a whole. But I hail the young people, mobilized as never before, the women, the workers ... all of these people who have just demonstrated again the legitimacy that is mine to hold power.

The first time the people of Côte d'Ivoire gave me legitimacy was on 22 October, by voting for me in large numbers (more than 59 per cent of the vote — that is a very good result). The second time it gave me legitimacy was at the time when an attempt was made to overturn that vote. The people took to the streets in their thousands and went to seek in the streets what it had given me in the ballot box, that is, State power. Today, following the outbreak of this war, the people is giving me a third legitimacy by being there on the streets every day to explain that they voted for a man, and that he is the man they support. That they put a power in place, and that they support that power. That is the message you are sending to me, that is the message you are sending to the world ... I am with you. I will not betray you.

We are engaged together in a democratic revolution. I think that often, people do not see clearly what is happening in Africa and in Côte d'Ivoire. But in Côte d'Ivoire, there is a democratic revolution. The visible part of this revolution began in 1990. But its gestation was long, difficult and painful, and during it some of our comrades in the struggle lost their lives. Some were overcome by discouragement and gave up the struggle. We who are here before you today, we are the survivors of that struggle. And you are right to pay tribute to us for all the hardships we endured for you, for all the humiliations we have been subjected to and for all the whole thorny path we have travelled. I am with you. We are together and I will never betray you. I ask you now not to bear a grudge against the politicians who were there in Marcoussis and in France. All of them, whatever party they are from, whatever position they hold, were motivated by a single desire, bring back peace. None of them was a traitor. Each of them felt he was doing right. It is for us today, and more particularly for me, the head of State, to accept everything that was done by the political parties which were at Linas-Marcoussis. I call on the political parties themselves not to shoot at one another. This is the time to unite.

This is the time to unite to save Côte d'Ivoire, to find the way of peace. The way of peace is difficult to find. It is not an easy way. It is not a wide, six-lane tarmac road. It is a track that sometimes cannot be seen, rocky, sandy, full of thorns. That is the way of peace ... Let every politician everywhere do his work in order to

find the way of peace for the whole of Côte d'Ivoire. Those who stumbled, who have missed their way and fallen, let us stretch out our hand to them to raise them up. Let us not shoot at them. In politics, there are two courses. There is betrayal, which is a voluntary act, and there is error, which is an involuntary act. If someone is a traitor, then yes, let us shoot at him. If he has not betrayed, but has made a mistake in good faith, let us stretch out our hand to raise him up.

Dear friends, dear compatriots, do not shoot at your representatives who were at Linas-Marcoussis, for I am convinced that each of them, so far as he was concerned, wanted to do good work. At this level of discourse, we need to show solidarity with all the victims of the war, an unexpected war, and therefore one that was not prepared for. I am referring in the first place, obviously, to those who died. Among the dead, we must distinguish those who, like Boga Doudou, did not have the chance to flee; those who were found in their beds and murdered in cold blood, because their death was programmed — Dagrou Loula, Dally Oblé, Colonel Yodé ... we will not forget them and we do not forget them and we cannot forget them. Victims of a nameless and totally unjustified barbarism, they died for us. And they died because people wanted to kill us, all of us.

But they are not the only victims, there are their wives, their children, whom we do not have the right to forget. I have a thought for all the refugees, all those who, surprised by the war, sought refuge in neighbouring countries — something unthinkable for Ivorians! Ivorians refugees? On the contrary, it is Côte d'Ivoire which was the land that welcomed all refugees, from West Africa and elsewhere. Today, this war has turned this situation upside down. Ivorians are refugees in Mali, in Guinea, in Liberia, in Ghana ... I should like to say to them that we have set up mechanisms for bringing them back to the country. Some, because they have not yet been brought back, believe that they have been forgotten. Can a mother forget her children? Can the nation forget its citizens? No, they are not forgotten. It is because of the slowness of the logistics we have put in place, because of the flight schedules, that they appear to have been forgotten. They will all come back. And those who have been displaced, these modern day refugees who are refugees in their own country? Many of them have lost everything.

To the foreigners living in Côte d'Ivoire, I should like to say this: despite the propaganda of hatred being unfurled against Côte d'Ivoire, some of them are telling the truth. They refuse to leave because they are safe. And even others who are virtually compelled to leave are speaking out. This war is absurd and contemptible. The attack on Côte d'Ivoire was an attack on the heart of West Africa. Now, everyone understands this.

An attack on Côte d'Ivoire is an attack on the heart of West Africa. All honour to those of whom it is said that we do not like them and who say that they still feel better in a Côte d'Ivoire at war than in their country of origin, and are here. I hail them and I say that there is no better witness than their presence among us. Before going on to analyse briefly the Marcoussis text, I should like to commend our defence and security forces, which today are in the front line. I mean in the first place the army, the army and the ground forces, the air forces, the navy and, in line with our current organizational structure, the fire brigade, the gendarmerie, which I hail because it paid a heavy price. The police, which was transformed by the force of events from police force, that is to say a force for the day-to-day maintenance of order, into a fighting force. The anti-riot squad, in particular, played a fighting role

like a military force. The custom service ... Ah, the customs! I was so proud of them. During this time of crisis, it collected more duty than our peacetime forecasts. The Forestry Commission, the Fire Brigade, I hail them in the first place because they bore the brunt of the aggression. The Chief of Staff was attacked in the night of 18-19 September. His men formed the front at a time when a column of rebels was trying to cut the Bingerville road to prevent them coming. They broke through. They came to the aid of the gendarmes penned into the Gendarmerie School. That night, the Gendarmerie School was the scene of the most violent clash. A dark night, a night of sorrow, a night of tears. The gendarmerie was attacked on several fronts. The home of the gendarmerie's top commander was attacked and machine-gunned. The gendarmerie camp at Agban, the famous gendarmerie camp at Agban, was surrounded and machine-gunned. The rebels even got inside, they tried to take the armoury and the powder magazine and to wipe out the whole of this elite corps, who succeeded in throwing off their attackers. The Gendarmerie School was attacked with heavy weapons — anti-tank rocket launchers — and our men gained the upper hand. The police, the Yopougon anti-riot squad, was surrounded and attacked with heavy weapons. All of these units fought valiantly, they fought off the enemy and drove him out of Abidjan. Honour and glory to our armed forces. Today, the rebels are occupying part of Ivorian territory. They are broadcasting on all the radio stations. They say they occupy 60 per cent of the territory. I have not done any sums to know exactly the percentage of the territory they occupy. But what is certain that our armed forces, our gendarmerie, our police, have succeeded in ensuring the security of 90 per cent of the economy, and 90 per cent of economic production is under the control of the government forces. This is why Côte d'Ivoire is continuing to live normally. What is certain is that our defence and security forces have been able to ensure the security of 82 per cent of the population ... There you have the truth. That is the truth, and that is also why this coup d'état failed. This, my dear friends, is why I say honour and glory to our defence forces, to our security forces. Now we are going to talk about the subject of your anger. When I returned home, one of my friends said to me "Does the people which is in the streets, in your view, have reasons to be in the streets?".

Now we are going to talk about the subject of your anger. When I returned home, I have friends who asked me if the people that was in the streets was in my view wrong to be in the streets. I told them no. And that if I was not President of the Republic, I would be with them in the Place de la République. I understand your anger. At a time when the discussions were not over, it was unbearable to see a rebel appearing on television to announce that he was minister of defence and his friend was minister of the interior — that is what sparked things off. From that moment on, no one was prepared any more to really look at what was going on in Marcoussis and Paris. That is why I say that if I was not President of the Republic, I would be in the street with you. For your rights. That is why before making any analysis, I would like to underline two points. The army of Côte d'Ivoire, the gendarmerie of Côte d'Ivoire and the police of Côte d'Ivoire will not be disarmed. This aspect, which is in the Marcoussis text and which was qualified in the annexes, has been the subject of a number of telephone calls and a number of approaches by the French Government, which has assured me that this was a bad reading and that it was never the intention of those who drafted the document that our defence and security forces should be disarmed. So I can reassure you that there is no question at all of Côte d'Ivoire's armed forces, gendarmerie and police being disarmed. Let that be clear to everyone.

The second point is that I have not yet formed a Government.

Thus there can be no question of saying that such and such a ministry belongs to such and such a person, or another to someone else. Ministers are assigned only when the President of the Republic, in exercise of the powers you conferred on by electing him, powers confirmed by the Constitution, signs the decree appointing the Government of the Republic. I have not appointed any Government.

And now I can go back to the text of the Marcoussis agreements and speak about them. We can talk freely about the Marcoussis text. First of all, I want to say that there is a great difference between the Lomé talks and the Marcoussis talks. The Lomé talks were organized by President Eyadéma, coordinator of the ECOWAS contact group on Côte d'Ivoire. He asked me to send him a State delegation to discuss with the rebel group. So I designated a balanced delegation made up of members of all the parties, members of the Government, an officer from the armed forces, a gendarmerie officer and a police officer. The discussion went on for two months. The essential point is that it was the State that was discussing directly with the rebels. In the case of Linas-Marcoussis, the inviting power, that is to say France, directly invited political parties, seven of them. And, in addition to the designated parties, three rebel movements. Legally speaking, it was thus maintained that this was a discussion among private parties. But I am the Head of State, and the aim of the discussion was to seek peace in Côte d'Ivoire. I thus cannot say that I reject this text, even though the State was not a direct party to the discussion. That is not possible. The text which came out of Marcoussis is a compromise text. I said in Paris that no compromise text is good. All the compromise texts I know of are all bad texts. But we have to live with them. They are poorly made texts but we have to work with them. The most salient aspects of the Marcoussis text, as far as what is not good is concerned, are those parts where the text is in contradiction with the Constitution of Côte d'Ivoire. For example, in the Marcoussis text the prime minister to be appointed cannot be removed until 2005. This is incompatible with the Constitution, which provides that the President of the Republic appoints the prime minister and dismisses him. There are a few points like that where an attempt was made to edge our presidential regime in the direction of a parliamentary regime. But we are not under a parliamentary regime. We are under a presidential regime, and the cornerstone of all the institutions is the President of the Republic.

I intend to retain all the prerogatives assigned to me under the Constitution.

I intend to resume all the responsibilities specified in the Constitution. That is why I tell you that the Marcoussis text cannot be regarded as a second Constitution. Between the Marcoussis text and the Constitution, I will apply the Constitution. That is why I have already said that everything to be found in the Marcoussis text, or the alteration of such and such an article of the Constitution or such and such a law, cannot be regarded as proposals, because we are not going to divest the people of its prerogatives where a referendum is concerned and we are not going to divest the National Assembly of its prerogatives when it comes to passing laws. That said, the Marcoussis text was written in the spirit of seeking a solution to our current problem.

All those who worked at Marcoussis are therefore to be thanked, for their aim is to find peace and we Ivorians, today, are seeking peace. And this text affirms outright the principle of the territorial integrity of Côte d'Ivoire. It affirms respect for the institutions of the Republic, restoration of the authority of the State over the

whole of the national territory, condemnation of coups d'état, and the ballot box as the only way of acceding to power. This is why I invite you, my dear compatriots, to accept the spirit of the Marcoussis agreements as a working basis. We are not alone.

The whole of the international community is watching us. Since the adoption of this text, ECOWAS, the African Union, the European Union and the United Nations have been calling us to say, "Don't worry, adopt the text and the necessary adjustments can be made afterwards. Otherwise we are with you." We cannot live as if we were alone. We cannot live as if we were cut off from the world.

I should like to say to all those who have lent us support and who have appealed to me over the past ten days to say that I accept and commit myself to the spirit of the Marcoussis text. I do not know how to cheat, I am not a trickster. So I do indeed accept the spirit and the overall framework of the Marcoussis agreements. That, moreover, is why in Paris I signed a decree to appoint the Prime Minister, Seydou Diarra, after consulting with those who were present in Paris. I know that his appointment is annoying to many of you, and that you are angry with me about it. I understand you. You are angry for two reasons, first because I did it in Paris, even if I did do it in our embassy. Next, because you did not want your Government, which was doing such a good job for you, to change. I understand you. But I made an analysis. I say, for the time being let us keep the support of the international community. It is pushing me to move towards a compromise, I am making this compromise, and it is for you that I have made this compromise. I said just now that the Constitution will apply.

Let Seydou Diarra carry on his consultations and propose a government to me. Your protection is that the last signature is always mine. That is your protection. A document that I have not signed is not valid. So you have the assurance that your man, your brother, is here and that he is watching over your interests. Let Seydou Diarra work, let him propose to us a government capable of working for the rapid restoration of peace in Côte d'Ivoire. If Seydou Diarra's appointment can bring us peace in Côte d'Ivoire, I do not regret having appointed him. But if his appointment is to heighten the confrontation and take us further away from peace, we will soon know. Until we have let him work, we shall not be able to tell. It is I who ask your forgiveness. I ask your forgiveness for all the mistakes that may have been made in Marcoussis or in Paris. I ask your forgiveness for everything that may have offended you. I have already told you that I am not a planter, or an industrialist, or a trader. My only interest is that this mandate you have given me should succeed and that you should have what you have never had. That is my only interest. So I am going to work for the implementation of the Marcoussis agreement.

I am going to work for the application of the Marcoussis agreement. I am going to work for the implementation of this agreement insofar as this agreement is not in contradiction with our Constitution. You need not worry as far as that is concerned, nothing will be done contrary to what you have decided. On the contrary, all we are going to try to do is any attempt to re-establish peace. We have already tried Accra. We have tried Bamako. We have tried Lomé. We have tried Dakar. But let us try again. Marcoussis and Paris, let us try again. It is we who are seeking peace, it is we who are asking. It is our country which is divided, we are seeking, let us try this. And if it doesn't work, we shall see, but if it does work, and I hope it will work, because we are tired of the war, if it does work, well, we shall all be able to smile again.

Dear compatriots, let us show patience. Let us show tolerance. I have called for unity, and there is no unity without tolerance. Let us try this new remedy. We have been offered many remedies, I have already indicated to you the Accra remedy, the Dakar remedy, the Lomé remedy, the Bamako remedy. We have not been cured, that is why we are still where we are. And I like the expression used by Thabo Mbeki in Paris, where he said: "We Africans, we have come to Paris because we did not find a solution in Africa"; that is our tragedy. So let us try this medicine, and let us see to it that it cures us. If it does not cure us, we shall try another medicine. But for the time being, let us trust in this medicine, and let us do everything so that it will cure us, so that it will rescue us from the state of war.

I am determined to liberate this country. I am determined to see to it that the authority of the State extends throughout the country. I am determined to leave to my successor the whole of the country as I received it. Set to work! Set to work! Let us all set to work! You know that what makes Côte d'Ivoire is its capacity to produce wealth. If we are envied, it is because we work. I would remind you that we are all the same the number one cocoa producer. I would remind you that we have 40 per cent of the wealth of the West African Monetary and Economic Union (WAMEU). We are not going to lose that. Let us set to work. Pupils, students, go to school. If I have to call on you to defend the motherland, I will call on you. Let us show tolerance. Let us show trust in one another. God bless Côte d'Ivoire!

Thank you.

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General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Fifty-seventh session
Agenda item 36
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Fifty-eighth year

Letter dated 12 March 2003 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a statistical breakdown of Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty committed during the month of February 2003 (see annex).

The breaches of Lebanon's sovereignty that Israel commits on land, at sea and in the air are in violation of the Blue Line and of the provisions of Security Council resolution 425 (1978), and they pose a threat to stability and promote a climate of tension in the region.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 36, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Houssam Asaad **Diab**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex to the letter dated 12 March 2003 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statistical breakdown of Israeli violations committed during the month of February 2003

In the air				*At sea*	*On the ground*			*Total*	*Remarks*
					Military attacks	*Field violations*	*Infringements*		
Jet fighters	Reconnaissance aircraft	Helicopters	Total	Violations of territorial waters and launching of flares	Air raids and bombardment of military outposts and important centres	Artillery bombardments, shooting and placement of installations inside Lebanese territory	Threats and brandishing of weapons, earthmoving and placement of concertina wire inside Lebanese territory		
12	6	4	22	2	-	3	2	29	Total violations in previous month: 48
									Table does not include violations in the occupied Shab'a farmlands and the Kafr Shuba hills area, a zone of military operations

United Nations S/2003/315

Security Council

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English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 12 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I wish to transmit to you herewith the daily report on the activities carried out by the inspection teams of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq on 12 March 2003.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Aldouri**
Permanent Representative

03-28139 (E) 200303 200303

Annex to the identical letters dated 12 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

Activities of the IAEA and UNMOVIC inspection teams in Iraq

Inspection activities carried out on Wednesday, 12 March 2003

I. IAEA inspection team

The team left the Canal Hotel at 9.15 a.m. and went to the Saddam Centre for Cancer and Medical Genetics Research. The team enquired about the work done at the Centre and about whether radiation sources were used to treat cancer. The team then proceeded to the Saddam Centre for Neurological Sciences, which belongs to the Ministry of Health. The team verified the arrival of an apparatus comprising a radiation source used to treat brain cancer and asked where it was obtained and how it worked. It then inspected the gamma-radiation operating room and observed the apparatus and its uses. On completing its mission, which lasted 1 hour and 15 minutes, the team returned to the Canal Hotel.

II. UNMOVIC inspection team (missiles)

Group I

The group left the Canal Hotel at 8.30 a.m. and went to the Technical Battalion located in the Taji area. It oversaw the destruction of three Sumud-2 missiles. On completing its mission, which lasted 4 hours, the group returned to the Canal Hotel.

Group II

The group left the Canal Hotel at 8.40 a.m. and went to the Karamah State Company, which belongs to the Military Industrialization Corporation (MIC). The group took an inventory of Sumud-2 missile parts, transferred them to the Technical Battalion at Taji, destroyed the blueprints for the missile and deleted the missile-related programmes in the computers. On completing its mission, which lasted 4 hours and 30 minutes, the group returned to the Canal Hotel.

Group III

The group set out from the Canal Hotel at 8.30 a.m. The group leader asked to go to the Mu'tasim plant, which belongs to the Rashid State Company. When halfway there, the group leader asked to go back to the Canal Hotel. The group did indeed return there without giving any reasons.

III. UNMOVIC inspection team (chemical)

The team left the Canal Hotel at 8.30 a.m. and went to the Dhat al-Sawari State Company for Chemical Industries, which is owned by the Ministry of Industry and Minerals. The team met Company officials and enquired about the nature of the

Company's production, the number of plants it has, its connection with other companies and whether it cooperates with MIC. The team then inspected all the Company's departments and plants. On completing its mission, which lasted 3 hours, the team returned to the Canal Hotel.

IV. UNMOVIC inspection team (biological)

Group I

The group left the Canal Hotel at 9.15 a.m. and went to the Iraqi Dairy Products and Soft Drinks Company, which belongs to the private sector. The group met with the Company manager and asked him about the Company's activities, the nature of its products, the number of employees and the type of testing done in the Company laboratory. It then inspected all the Company's departments. On completing its mission, which lasted 1 hour and 30 minutes, the group returned to the Canal Hotel.

Group II

The group left the Canal Hotel at 9.15 a.m. and went to the Baghdad Juice Production Company. The group met company officials and asked them when the Company had ceased to operate and when it had resumed operation, whether it had a quality control laboratory, what kind of testing was done in the laboratory and how many employees the Company had. It then inspected all the Company's departments and warehouses. On completing its mission, which lasted 1 hour and 15 minutes, the group returned to the Canal Hotel.

V. UNMOVIC joint inspection team in Baghdad

The team left the Canal Hotel at 9 a.m. and went to one of the missile battalions belonging to the Ministry of Defence. The group met with one of the battalion officers and asked him about the battalion's technical equipment and the formal name of the unit. The team then inspected the unit. On completing its mission, which lasted 1 hour, it returned to the Canal Hotel.

VI. Interviews

UNMOVIC requested a private interview in a Baghdad hotel with an Iraqi expert. The National Monitoring Directorate encouraged him to hold the interview and notified him that he should appear at the appointed time and place. The interview was in fact conducted by UNMOVIC.

United Nations S/2003/316

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 March 2003

Original: English

Letter dated 12 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a statement made on 11 March 2003 to Parliament by the Hon. Amama Mbabazi, Minister of Defence of the Republic of Uganda, on the situation in Ituri, Democratic Republic of the Congo (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Semakula **Kiwanuka**
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations

03-28298 (E) 180303

Annex to the letter dated 12 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Statement to Parliament by the Honourable Amama Mbabazi, M.P., and Minister of Defence on the situation in Ituri, 11 March 2003

1. Introduction

When Uganda signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999 after protracted negotiations, we were confident then, as we are now, that it answers the internal dimension to the conflict which is being addressed through the inter-Congolese dialogue and the external dimension to the conflict which Uganda also addressed through our own efforts of defeating armed terrorists who had been operating from the Congo and the United Nations-supported programme of disarmament, demobilization, resettlement and reintegration of these terrorists. Uganda was the first country to radically implement its obligations under Lusaka by, among other things, unilaterally withdrawing most of its units from the Congo.

Before the total withdrawal of the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF), the United Nations requested Uganda to maintain a force in Bunia for some time to avoid genocide, which was about to take place there.

It is against this background that the Luanda Agreement signed in September 2002 between President Kabila and President Museveni facilitated by President Dos Santos was signed, providing a legal basis for UPDF to stay in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to ensure security for the people of Ituri and the completion of work of the Ituri pacification before its total withdrawal.

2. Background to the Hema-Lendu conflict

Whereas our investigations so far point to the conflict between the two communities having started in 1911 and continued in 1965, 1967, 1979, 1981 and 1992, the fighting which started in Ndjugu in April 1999 has its seeds in the land law and corrupt legal system of land administration in the Congo.

According to that law, on the expiry of two years after an application of registered interest in land has been lodged with the Registrar, without any other claimant challenging such application, the interest of the applicant is automatically registered and the applicant gets title for it.

In 1996, three prominent and rich Hema landlords applied for land from the Land Board in Kisangani, which was occupied by Lendus on customary tenure basis.

The three Hemas, namely, the Singa-Kodjo, Lobo Tsoro and Savo families, had already acquired large land concessions from the Belgian Administration.

In April 1999, the three were granted leases by the Land Supervisor and started evicting Lendus who had occupied the same land from time immemorial and who were not aware of the application or grant of the said title. This led to intense fighting between the two communities with very heavy loss of lives and destruction of property.

Other factors which delayed the immediate resolution of the conflict include:

(a) A rebellion, which was overwhelmed by the magnitude of the problem and bearing in mind the size of the Congo and absence of infrastructure in the country, failed to solve the problem politically by mobilizing the population to address their land grievances when law and order returns to the Congo.

(b) Unfortunately, mistakes were made by some of our commanders who, acting in ignorance of the history of the problem, and ill-trained in the administration of justice, were used by some groups against others and failed to execute their mission in an impartial manner.

A number of community leaders have since established links with us and when our investigations are complete, disciplinary action will be taken against any officer implicated in this.

(c) The failure of the United Nations and the international community to either provide an effective force to protect the people and disarm the militias or give Uganda the mandate to do so beyond the one battalion which was guarding Bunia airport. Uganda was being criticized for staying in the Congo and condemned for proposing to withdraw from the Congo.

(d) The Kinshasa Government, especially under the late President Kabila, which sought to use the grievances of the Lendus as a destabilizing force against Uganda's presence in eastern Congo by arming them, and Lendus who lacked military leadership and turned their newly acquired arms against innocent civilians indiscriminately in all the 18 communities of Ituri, leading to generalized instability.

(e) Due to the attacks by the Lendu combatants and with the withdrawal of UPDF from all the territories of Ituri except Bunia town, some Hema leaders came to Uganda in search of arms to use in intertribal war. Uganda refused to arm them on a sectarian basis as we could not guarantee the proper use of those arms.

Those leaders went to another country, which armed them.

Initially we understood the reason behind these Hema moves of self-defence but the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) leadership, which has been in charge of Ituri for the last eight months (mainly from the Gegere, a Hema subgroup), started a programme of using their newly acquired arms to conquer other tribes, and it has been reluctant to accept the Ituri pacification programme. UPC has also been used by other forces interested in undermining the Lusaka and Luanda agreements on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to threaten the security of Uganda.

A disagreement emerged within UPC on the number and type of weapons received. The country which gave them weapons delivered more than what they had asked for and the type of weapons received included anti-aircraft systems, anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, heavy artillery and air defence systems which could neither be for self-defence against Lendus or for an intertribal conflict.

3. Steps taken by Uganda

Uganda has taken deliberate steps to implement the Luanda Agreement by:

(a) Facilitating a tripartite meeting involving ministers from the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with Thomas Lubanga on the need for the

Ituri Pacification Commission (IPC) as the best platform to address security issues in Ituri, especially to address the complaint by UPC that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was still arming the Lendu;

(b) Raising the question of secret airdropping of arms contrary to the spirit of the Lusaka and Luanda agreements with relevant regional leaders and the signatories of the Lusaka Agreement;

(c) Facilitating a meeting between Thomas Lubanga of UPC and Mbusa Nyamwisi of the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie — Mouvement de libération (RCD-ML) attended by an observer from the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in which the two forces ceased hostilities as a way of setting the IPC forward by signing the Kampala Understanding on 15 November 2002;

(d) Facilitating various meetings in Uganda between Thomas Lubanga of UPC and Lendu leaders in which the Lendus agreed to cease hostilities, start joint patrols and start IPC. Unfortunately Lubanga's group refused to sign the Arusha Agreement and take steps to launch IPC;

(e) Arranging in Dar es Salaam a meeting between President Kabila and Chief Kahwa (then belonging to UPC) with a view to removing all the obstacles to the Ituri Pacification Commission;

(f) Sending many special delegations to Bunia to engage the UPC leadership on the dangers of using the gun to conquer other tribes which have accepted dialogue.

On 7 and 8 February 2003, the UPDF High Command, after reviewing the security situation in the country and the region, advised the President to seek a no-objection from President Kabila to the extension of the mission of UPDF in the Congo to include taking all necessary measures to enable Ituri pacification to take place, leading to the withdrawal of UPDF from the Congo.

4. Luanda Agreement reviewed

On 9 and 10 February 2003, the President of Uganda met with the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with Angola represented by Minister of External Affairs Miranda, at a meeting hosted by President Mpaka, in which the Presidents agreed to establish a new framework for the Ituri Pacification Commission, a new calendar beginning on 17 February 2003, to be followed by the withdrawal of UPDF from Bunia by 20 March 2003 when, it was planned, IPC would have completed its work.

Their Excellencies condemned those who continue to supply weapons to armed factions in the Ituri region, resulting in the escalation of violence and human suffering, and also agreed to a ministerial level meeting on the implementation of what had been agreed upon, to be held on 14 February 2003 in Luanda. At the Dar es Salaam meeting, UPC was represented by Mr. Lubanga, who agreed to all the proceedings and resolutions.

At the 14 February 2003 meeting in Angola, Uganda was represented by the Hon. Col. Otafiire and the Hon. Col. Mayombo and attended by all the signatories to the Luanda Agreement, including MONUC. It was agreed, among other things, that Uganda would provide security for all activities of the Ituri Pacification Preparatory

Committee and the Ituri Pacification Commission, from 17 February to 20 March 2003.

The meeting also put in place the formula for representation to IPC, to include notables, the business community, civil society, traditional chiefs, interest groups and military forces.

It furthermore put in place a mechanism for considering the political aspirations of the protagonists in Ituri through the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.

The UPC leadership was immediately briefed by the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and Uganda on the outcome of the Luanda meeting and Uganda appointed Brig. Kale Kaihura Chief Political Commissar, UPDF, and Maj. Muhoozi the Commanding Officer of the 53rd Battalion in Bunia, to represent it on the Ituri Pacification Preparatory Committee.

Immediately after the Luanda meeting, UPC issued a statement condemning MONUC and the United Nations for being partial, Uganda for being against pacification and the Kinshasa Government for continuing war in Ituri.

5. Action by UPC since the Luanda meeting of 14 February 2003

(a) Changed the programme of the Ituri Pacification Preparatory Committee from 17 February 2003 to 3 March 2003 without any satisfactory reason.

(b) Has been broadcasting anti-Uganda, anti-MONUC and anti-Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo propaganda on the *Bunia Radio*.

(c) Rejected the formula agreed to in Luanda of representation on the Ituri Pacification Preparatory Committee.

(d) Started a parallel Ituri Pacification Commission excluding other dominant and armed factions in Ituri.

(e) Accused Uganda, without any evidence, of responsibility for arming Lendus and massacring people in Bogoro when UPDF had no forces there.

(f) On 24 February 2003, after it informed Gen. Diallo, the MONUC Commander, that IPC was a non-starter, Gen. Diallo's plane was shot at in territory controlled by UPC.

(g) Forcing at gunpoint *Voice of America* journalist Mike Alelenge to broadcast a story that Brig. Kale had been taken hostage in order to force UPDF out of Bunia. This was done by UPC Ministers Rafiki and Beiza.

(h) Falsely alleging that UPDF had killed two UPC soldiers and rejecting an investigation of the matter when [it was revealed that] the soldiers had died in an area occupied by UPC.

6. Events leading to the clash on 6 March 2003

(a) On 1 March 2003, UPDF received intelligence that UPC was purchasing food from Goma and Bunia town and stockpiling supplies for a long war with UPDF.

(b) On 3 March 2003, UPC took a UPDF Information Operations Capt. Birungi hostage till UPDF left Bunia. He was later released after UPDF intervened.

(c) On 4 March 2003, UPC gave UPDF an ultimatum to leave Bunia town or else be attacked by UPC. UPDF withdrew from the detachment of Yambio and police headquarters in town to avoid the conflict.

(d) In a letter dated 4 March 2003 from Brig. Kale to Thomas Lubanga of UPC, copied to MONUC, Brig. Kale raised five points of concern to UPDF, which included UPC laying ambushes on the Bunia airport road against UPDF soldiers; sniping at UPDF soldiers at water points; deploying in areas controlled by UPDF; verbal abuse; and other provocative attacks against UPDF, and requested him to put an end to this peacefully.

(e) On 5 March 2003, UPDF received confirmatory intelligence from a UPC defector and Chief of Military Intelligence Commander Ali of UPC plans, encouraged by a foreign country, to attack UPDF positions at Dele and the airport. The source had been at the meeting where the orders had been given.

Furthermore, UPC had been promised reinforcements from that foreign country through the airfields of Mongwalu, Irumu, Bambu and Bule.

The plan included the simultaneous launching of 1,600 Ugandan dissidents under Lt. Cols. Mande and Kyakabaale and Col. Muzoora, who had been reorganizing from Ituri, with the knowledge of UPC, into Uganda from the Aboro hills near Fataki north-east of Bunia town.

We shared this intelligence with MONUC and some friendly foreign Governments.

7. Attack on UPDF positions

(a) On 6 March 2003, at about 0715 Uganda time, UPC forces attacked a UPDF detachment at Dele and the airport position using mortars and heavy weapons. UPDF repulsed them and went ahead to capture the whole of Bunia town. The main UPC force withdrew northwards to Nizi and in the direction of Fataki and Mungbwalu. Other forces which had been at camp Ndruma withdrew southwards and reorganized at Nyakunde. UPC has been waiting for reinforcements by air at the Bule Mungbwalu and Irumu airfields.

(b) During the initial shelling, one UPDF soldier died and 14 were injured. Two soldiers died later as a result of injuries. There were 17 UPC soldiers counted dead and many UPC casualties, and UPDF captured a lot of arms and ammunition that had been recently supplied. These include many anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.

(c) There was no damage to property during the fighting as only light weapons had been used in town. However, one building belonging to an individual named Piero, which was said to have been storing fuel, caught fire. Another building, belonging to Tibasiima, which had been used as a mortar position to shell UPDF positions, was damaged during neutralizing fire.

(d) There was isolated looting by Lendu militias who took advantage of the fighting. The situation was immediately put under control by UPDF and many properties were returned to their owners.

(e) Five civilians died and 40 were injured.

(f) Concurrently with the above, there were disagreements within Lubanga's group. On 1 March 2003, there was a mutiny led by Commander Jerome Kakawavu Bakande, Sector Commander based in Aru. His area of responsibility extended to Aliwara. Commander Jerome cited the following for his action:

(i) The UPC movement under Lubanga was an obstacle to the process of pacification of the Ituri region and the unification of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in general;

(ii) UPC was continuously practising tribalism, nepotism, selfishness, favouritism and non-transparency, an indication that the movement was not prepared to cooperate in the 3 March 2003 scheduled agreement for the control of Ituri.

Proposed course of action

1. The Government of Uganda has decided to:

(a) Deploy adequate forces to stabilize the whole of Bunia town and the environs;

(b) Secure roads to Bunia to ensure the supply of food to the town;

(c) Contact and facilitate humanitarian agencies for the distribution of medicine and food to the population;

(d) Make urgent preparations with MONUC to start the Ituri Pacification Commission to fill the political vacuum by an agreeable and all-inclusive administration.

As soon as this is implemented, UPDF will withdraw all its troops from Congo and hand over Ituri to the transitional Government of the Congo.

Interahamwe/Ex-FAR/ALIR/Mai Mai links

Uganda would like to put on record that it has never organized or had plans to organize in Uganda or anywhere in the area it controls in the Congo, Interahamwe, Ex-FAR, Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR) or Mai Mai with the intention of attacking or conducting a proxy war against Rwanda, as is persistently being claimed in the Rwanda media. There is a reliable and credible mechanism to investigate these allegations, ably chaired by the Rt. Hon. Claire Short on behalf of Her Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom.

Uganda supports and shall strictly adhere to the London Understanding in its relations with Rwanda and to the Lusaka and Luanda agreements in its relations with the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

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Security Council

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Identical letters dated 13 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the daily report for 13 March 2003 on the activities of the inspection teams of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Aldouri**
Permanent Representative

03-28290 (E) 180303 190303

Annex to the identical letters dated 13 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

Activities of the IAEA and UNMOVIC inspection teams in Iraq

Inspection activities on Thursday, 13 March 2003

I. UNMOVIC multidisciplinary team

Two helicopters took off from the Rashid airfield at 0845 hours carrying the UNMOVIC team. The helicopters reconnoitred the desert region near the historic palace of Ukhaydir south of the town of Karbala. The helicopters did not alight at the site but merely carried out an aerial inspection. The team completed its assignment and returned to the Rashid airfield.

II. UNMOVIC multidisciplinary team in Mosul

The team left the Nineveh Palace Hotel at 0900 hours for the privately owned brick factory and chicken farm located on the Mosul-Rabi'ah road. The team inspected the factory and the farm and photographed the gravel heaps and the factory's silo. The team completed its assignment, which lasted half an hour, and returned to the Nineveh Palace Hotel.

III. UNMOVIC biological inspection team

1. A first group left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 0830 hours for the Sharqiyah Frozen Food Company (private sector). The group interviewed the company's manager and asked him about the company's activity and affiliation and about the quantity of the output and the types of tests carried out in the laboratory. It then inspected the plastics department, the dairy department, the juice department and all the buildings on the site. The group completed its assignment, which lasted two hours and forty minutes, and returned to the Canal Hotel.

2. A second group left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 0840 hours for the bomb destruction site at Aziziyah. The group observed the excavation work under way at the site and learned about the bombs and ordnance extracted in the course of the excavation. The group completed its assignment, which lasted two and a quarter hours, and returned to the Canal Hotel.

IV. UNMOVIC missile inspection team

1. A first group left the Canal Hotel at 0830 hours for the Technical Corps site at Taji. The group observed the destruction of three Sumud-2 missiles and six warheads. The group completed its assignment, which lasted four hours, and returned to the Canal Hotel.

2. A second group left the Canal Hotel at 0830 hours for the Karamah State enterprise. The group supervised the removal of the remaining parts of the Sumud-2 missiles and a survey of the company's computer programmes relating to the Sumud-2 missiles. The group completed its assignment, which lasted four hours, and returned to the Canal Hotel.

3. A third group left the Canal Hotel at 0830 hours for the Mu'tasim plant belonging to the Rashid State Enterprise, a subsidiary of the Military Industrial Corporation. The group tagged some Fath missiles and then inspected the plant's departments. The group completed its assignment, which lasted two hours, and returned to the Canal Hotel.

V. UNMOVIC chemical team

The team left the Canal Hotel at 0830 hours for the Nu'maniyah Pickles and Canned Foods Company (private sector). The team interviewed one of the company's officials and asked him about the main changes in recent years, how many plants the company had and how many workers. The team then inspected all the company's premises. The team completed its assignment, which lasted two and a half hours. In the course of the journey back to the hotel, one of the cars was in a driving accident that resulted in the death of one inspector, following his evacuation to the Rashid Military Hospital, despite all the dedicated emergency measures taken by the Iraqi side to save him. One other inspector was also injured in the accident and is under constant observation in the same hospital.

VI. Aerial reconnaissance aircraft

At 1025 hours a Mirage IV reconnaissance aircraft entered Iraqi airspace and left it at 1200 hours. The aircraft reconnoitred a number of areas in Iraq. The reconnaissance operation lasted one hour and fifty-three minutes.

VII. Interviews

UNMOVIC requested an interview with an Iraqi specialist in a Baghdad hotel. The National Monitoring Directorate encouraged him to give the interview and told him to attend at the time and place specified. UNMOVIC apologized for not conducting the interview and requested that it should be postponed to another time, without giving any reasons.

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Security Council

Distr.: General
14 March 2003

Original: English

Letter dated 14 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of the Government of the Republic of Rwanda on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, issued at Kigali on 14 March 2003.

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Stanislas **Kamanzi**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

03-28284 (E) 170303

Annex to the letter dated 14 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Statement on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, issued by the Government of Rwanda at Kigali on 14 March 2003

On 6 March 2003 Ugandan forces overran the town of Bunia and have since continued to reinforce, with heavy armaments, including tanks, armoured personnel carriers and heavy artillery, the whole of the Ituri region.

The Government of Rwanda is shocked by the silence and inaction of the international community, which in the past has strongly demanded, through various Security Council resolutions and other diplomatic channels, the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The Government of Rwanda wishes to remind the international community that it is within this context and in line with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the 30 July 2002 Pretoria Agreement that it withdrew all its forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in spite of the persistent threat to its security.

It should be recalled that Rwanda has faced a security threat from the Democratic Republic of the Congo ever since a United Nations sanctioned "Operation Turquoise" organized safe passage for ex-FAR and Interahamwe into the then Zaire. Under the good care of various United Nations agencies and international non-governmental organizations, these genocidal forces began to reorganize, re-arm and launch attacks on Rwanda with the help of successive Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Today, in spite of those agreements and Rwanda's total withdrawal from the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo Government has continued to supply and support the ex-FAR and Interahamwe. This has enabled them (ex-FAR and Interahamwe) to occupy some of the defensive positions previously held by the Rwanda Defence Forces, bringing them closer to Rwanda's borders. Once again the international community is silent and inactive.

Presently a new and dangerous situation is developing in the eastern Congo, where the Government of Uganda, working with the Kinshasa Government, is deploying its troops together with the Forces armées congolaises (FAC) and ex-FAR/Interahamwe into areas of Beni, Butembo, Lubero and Kanyabayonga in North Kivu, thus threatening Rassemblement conglais pour la démocratie (RCD) positions. This poses a direct security threat to Rwanda.

When Rwanda undertook to withdraw its troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the understanding was that such a situation and threat to its security would not arise again. This threat is implicitly recognized by the international community, through their incessant appeals to Rwanda to refrain from any counter measures.

If the international community has found it acceptable for Uganda to return to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for all the dubious reasons it has given, then it is legitimate that Rwanda should go in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to contain this new situation.

The United Nations must, therefore, demand and obtain the total and immediate withdrawal of Ugandan troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the return of Kabila forces to their original defensive positions.

Should the international community fail to reverse this development promptly and decisively, Rwanda would be compelled to assume its responsibility and take appropriate measures to protect its people.

United Nations S/200

Security Council

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Letter dated 14 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a letter dated 13 March 2003 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, Mr. Naji Sabri, addressed to you, concerning the decision taken by the United Nations Secretariat to withdraw the international observers of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) from their posts.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Aldouri**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

03-28252 (E) 140303 140303

Annex to the letter dated 14 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

We were informed by the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) on 12 March 2003 that it had withdrawn the international observers stationed along the border of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait and gathered them in the Mission's two headquarters on either side of the boundary in preparation for full evacuation.

UNIKOM was established in accordance with paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), which specified that its mandate was "... to deter violations of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of the demilitarized zone and to observe any hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the territory of one State against the other".

In its resolution 689 (1991), the Security Council approved the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the deployment of the observer unit. The resolution entrusted the Security Council with the task of deciding whether the unit should be continued or terminated.

In paragraph 1 of resolution 806 (1993), the Security Council "underline[d] once again its guarantee of the inviolability of the international boundary between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq and its decision to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as provided for in paragraph 4 of resolution 687 (1991)".

The hostile American build-up has reached more than 140,000 soldiers in Kuwait and breaches have been made in the demilitarized zone in preparation for an attack on Iraq. Hence, the decision of the United Nations Secretariat to withdraw the UNIKOM observers from their posts along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border is a measure that is inconsistent with the responsibility of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security and a violation of relevant Security Council resolutions.

I wish to remind you that when the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 6 October 1994 (S/1994/1173) complaining about the deployment of Iraqi armed forces in the area of the Iraqi Governorate of Basra, the Security Council rushed to adopt resolution 949 (1994), which condemned the "... recent military deployments by Iraq in the direction of the border with Kuwait" and demanded that Iraq withdraw those forces.

Based on the above, and with a view to preserving the key role of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security and preventing war and aggression, I appeal to you to intervene immediately to revoke the order to withdraw the United Nations observers from their posts along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border and instruct them to return to their duties, as mandated in Security Council resolutions, in order to deter border violations and monitor any hostile activity by the American forces amassed in Kuwait for the purpose, as avowed by the American administration and not concealed by the Government of Kuwait, of attacking the Republic of Iraq, which would be in flagrant violation of international law, the

Charter of the United Nations and relevant Security Council resolutions and constitute a clear threat to international peace and security.

(*Signed*) Naji **Sabri**
Minister for Foreign Affairs

United Nations S/2003/320

Security Council

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16 March 2003

Original: English

Letter dated 15 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

We would like to bring to the attention of the members of the Security Council the joint declaration by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of France, Mr. de Villepin, the Russian Federation, Mr. Ivanov, and Germany, Mr. Fischer, adopted on 15 March 2003 (see annex).

We should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

On behalf of the Permanent Representatives of France, Ambassador de la Sablière, and the Russian Federation, Ambassador Lavrov

(*Signed*) Gunter **Pleuger**
Permanent Representative of Germany

03-28265 (E) 160303 160303

Annex to the letter dated 15 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French and Russian]

Joint declaration of 15 March 2003

The shared goal of the international community is the disarmament of Iraq pursuant to the decisions of the United Nations Security Council. Security Council resolution 1441 (2002), adopted unanimously, provides for an unprecedented inspections regime.

We reaffirm that nothing in the current circumstances justifies abandoning the inspections process or resorting to force.

The successive reports of Mr. Hans Blix and Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei have shown that the inspections are producing results. The disarmament of Iraq has begun, and there is every reason to believe that it can be completed rapidly and in accordance with the rules set out by the Council. Iraq, for its part, must cooperate actively and unconditionally.

France, Germany and the Russian Federation, supported by China, have submitted proposals for achieving that objective by defining key disarmament tasks and establishing a rigorous timetable.

Suggestions in the same spirit have been put forward by other members of the Council. The unity of the Council can be preserved on the basis of these efforts, in accordance with the principles established by resolution 1441 (2002). All members of the Council bear a particular responsibility for ensuring that it is not divided at this crucial time.

The programme of work of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) is to be submitted to the Council on Tuesday. We propose that the Council should then meet at the ministerial level to approve key disarmament tasks and establish an implementation timetable which is both demanding and realistic.

The use of force can be only a last resort. A peaceful approach is preferred by the Security Council and supported by the vast majority of the international community; we solemnly appeal to all members of the Council to make every effort to ensure that such an approach prevails.

United Nations S/2003/320*

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 March 2003

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Letter dated 15 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

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(*Signed*) Gunter **Pleuger**
Permanent Representative of Germany

* Reissued for technical reasons.

03-28265* (E) 180303 180303

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United Nations S/2003/321

Security Council

Distr.: General
17 March 2003

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Seventeenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1436 (2002) of 24 September 2002, in which the Council urged the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to complete, within eight months, the first and second phases of the Mission's drawdown plan, as presented in my fifteenth report (S/2002/987) of 5 September 2002. The Council also requested me to report on the progress made and the planning of subsequent phases, and to make any necessary recommendations. By the same resolution, the Security Council authorized the deployment of up to 170 civilian police in UNAMSIL and requested me to provide updates on their deployment. The present report provides the requested updates, and contains an assessment of the progress made towards achieving the key security benchmarks set out in my fifteenth report concerning the overall efforts to consolidate peace in Sierra Leone.

II. Security situation

2. The overall political and security situation in Sierra Leone remained generally stable during much of the reporting period, albeit volatile on the Liberian border. This overall stability has facilitated the process of gradual peace consolidation and the implementation of some of the principal benchmarks described in my fifteenth report. However, a number of alarming developments have been reported in early 2003. In particular, on 13 January 2003 the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) Wellington barracks armory in East Freetown was attacked by a group of former soldiers and some civilians, whose intention was to steal a large quantity of weapons. The attack was unsuccessful due to resistance offered by RSLAF staff and preventive measures taken by the Sierra Leone police.

3. The ongoing investigation by the Sierra Leone police into the attack has uncovered a plan involving ex-combatants and some serving soldiers aimed at destabilizing the State authority and creating conditions in which the Special Court established by an Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone pursuant to Security Council resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000 might be unable to discharge its mandate. Johnny Paul Koroma, the former Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) leader, and later Chairman of the Peace and

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Liberation Party and a Member of Parliament, was implicated in the plot and declared wanted in connection with it. During an attempt by the Sierra Leone police to arrest him, Mr. Koroma managed to escape from his house under circumstances that have yet to be clarified, and has remained at large.

4. Meanwhile, about 100 other suspects have been detained thus far. Charges have been brought against 16 of them. It is widely believed that these incidents were to a considerable degree connected with the beginning of the functioning of the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Though many of the ex-Civil Defence Force (CDF) and ex-Revolutionary United Front (RUF) combatants have come to terms with the reality of the Court, those of them who fear indictments appear to be seeking to frustrate the process.

5. In this connection, it is important to mention that on 10 March the Prosecutor of the Special Court made a public statement in which he announced that indictments had been brought against former RUF, AFRC, West Side Boys, and CDF leaders, namely, Foday Sankoh, Johnny Paul Koroma, Sam Bockarie, Issa Sesay, Alex Brima, Moris Kallon and Sam Hinga Norman. All of the indictees except for Koroma and Bockarie are currently in custody. The crimes alleged in the indictments include, among others, murder, rape, extermination, acts of terror, enslavement, looting and burning, sexual slavery, conscription of children into an armed force and attacks on UNAMSIL peacekeepers and humanitarian workers.

6. On 10 January, some 70 Liberian combatants believed to be members of Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) crossed the border into Sierra Leone and attacked the village of Mandavulahun in the Kailahun Salient. The RSLAF troops from the 8th Battalion that were deployed in the area retreated, leaving behind some of their equipment.

7. The incidents mentioned above affected the confidence of the public in the security of the State. They appeared to have lent credence to the feeling that RSLAF and the Sierra Leone police still need considerable training.

8. Some other trends highlighted in my previous reports seem to have persisted. In spite of the Government's undertaking, at the Consultative Group meeting held on 13 and 14 November 2002 in Paris, to disband all CDF structures, no progress has been made in this regard. Instead, some CDF leaders have been clamouring for the transformation of CDF into a territorial defence force. In a symptomatic development, the re-emerged Civil Defence Union has been propagating negative information about the Government's ability to handle security.

9. At the same time, the large numbers of unemployed youths, mainly concentrated in urban and mining centres throughout the country, present another long-term issue. In addition to being a security problem, they are regularly interfering in diamond mining. Some youth groups appear to enjoy political patronage, and the Sierra Leone police seem to be reluctant or unable to challenge the undermining of State authority by these groups, especially in Koidu and Tongo fields in the eastern region.

III. Implementation of the drawdown plan

10. In my sixteenth report on UNAMSIL (S/2002/1417) of 24 December 2002, I provided details on the progress made in the implementation of the first two phases

of the Mission's drawdown plan. The first phase, which started in September 2002, was completed in November 2002 with the withdrawal of some 600 troops from the Bangladeshi and Nigerian contingents, as well as reconnaissance helicopters that were considered no longer essential. The implementation of the second drawdown phase, which envisages the withdrawal of 3,900 troops, is still in progress. In December 2002 and January 2003, the Pakistani artillery unit, the Ghanaian headquarters sector 3 staff and the Kenyan sector 2 staff were repatriated, which allowed the Mission to reduce the force strength from 16,000 to 15,500. Simultaneously, the five military sectors were reduced to three.

11. The next stage of the second phase of the drawdown commenced in March with the repatriation of the Bangladeshi logistic battalion and a reduction in the strength of the Bangladeshi signals battalion. This phase will continue with the repatriation of the Nigerian contingent based at Goderich, near Freetown, the Guinean battalion and the Ghanaian level-2 hospital, to be completed in May 2003. The force strength will thereby be reduced to 13,000 troops.

12. The completion of phase 2 will be followed by a period of review and consolidation of United Nations positions. However, planning for phase 3 of the drawdown is already at an advanced stage. That phase will run from August 2003 to the end of 2004; it is envisaged that the strength of the force will be reduced further, from 13,000 to about 5,000. That very substantial reduction will obviously be closely linked to the achievement of critical benchmarks established by the Security Council, most significant among which remains the capacity of the Sierra Leone police and RSLAF to maintain security. The risks inherent in the implementation of this phase are recognized to be much greater than those during phase 2, and the UNAMSIL operational plan is being worked out accordingly.

13. In this phase, the force will progressively be concentrated in the Freetown and Lungi peninsulas in the west, and the Tongo and Kono diamond-mining areas and the Liberian border region in the east, with commensurate and staged repatriation of force elements in the central region. At the final stage of this phase, the remaining troops will be concentrated exclusively in Freetown. The military observers, however, will remain at the current level and will remain active across the entire country.

14. UNAMSIL expects to implement phase 3 in several steps, each to be followed by a careful assessment of the prevailing security situation. Step one envisages a reduction of force troops from 13,000 to 12,300; sector centre's Nigerian battalion will repatriate from its base in Makeni by August 2003 on completion of its six-month tour, with sub-units from the Bangladeshi battalion at Magburaka relocating to Makeni if so required. During step two, the number of troops is expected to be reduced to 11,500, after the Bangladeshi battalion has been repatriated on completion of its eight-month tour in November 2003, with another Bangladeshi battalion providing back-up as required. It will be important to retain the attack-and-support helicopter assets in the theatre throughout phase 3, to provide the necessary monitoring and deterrence along Sierra Leone's borders and to enforce peace if required. The support helicopters will be used to deploy the rapid force reserve in support of the Sierra Leone police or army in areas vacated by UNAMSIL as may be necessary.

IV. Strengthening the security sector

15. In paragraph 4 of its resolution 1436 (2002), the Security Council stipulated that the implementation of the UNAMSIL drawdown plan should be guided by an evaluation of the security situation in the country and a review of the capacity of the Sierra Leone security sector to take responsibility for internal and external security. The joint mechanisms established by UNAMSIL and the Government of Sierra Leone, which include an integrated planning group and joint meetings of senior UNAMSIL military officers and the National Security Coordination Group, have met regularly to take stock of the prevailing security conditions. The Steering Committee that coordinates the efforts to strengthen the Sierra Leone police and comprises the Sierra Leone police, UNAMSIL and the Commonwealth police advisers and is chaired by the Inspector General of the Sierra Leone police, also meets regularly.

A. Sierra Leone police

16. The efforts of the Sierra Leone Government, UNAMSIL and the Commonwealth Safety and Security Project to strengthen the capacity of the Sierra Leone police have focused on increasing the size and capacity of the police force by recruiting and training new cadets, improving their policing skills and planning for their deployment, in conjunction with the drawdown of UNAMSIL. A key constraint to expanding the police force remains, however, the limited capacity of the Police Training School at Hastings. The Government and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) will soon increase the capacity of the school to 320 cadets through joint funding for the rehabilitation of premises. To meet the immediate need for the school's expansion, UNAMSIL has offered to lend some containers, which will soon be set up as classrooms. The Sierra Leone police currently have sufficient reserve candidates to fill the next class, in April 2003. They are also confident of meeting the subsequent envisaged goal of recruiting approximately 1,000 new officers in 2003.

17. In recent days, UNAMSIL has discovered, after verifying the number of officers on the payroll, that the current level of the Sierra Leone police may be as low as 6,053, as opposed to a previously reported level of approximately 7,000 serving officers. Furthermore, the annual attrition rate may be up to 500 officers per year. Therefore, in order to reach the projected strength of 9,500 officers by 2005, up to 1,600 new cadets should be recruited per year between 2003 and 2005. This would require both doubling the current capacity of the Police Training School and a major recruitment drive. The Sierra Leone police have yet to confirm their estimated requirements. Until then, the strength of 9,500 officers remains a planning figure. However, these new findings stress the immediate need for additional donor support to rehabilitate the Police Training School at Hastings, as well as a review of the recruitment strategy.

18. The establishment of the joint strategy to support training has paved the way for the deployment of the United Nations civilian police trainers. UNAMSIL and the Secretariat are presently conducting assessments in potential contributing countries to identify the best candidates for the Mission. Unfortunately, despite strenuous efforts, the recruitment has been hampered by a paucity of well-qualified candidates in required professions.

19. So far, 64 civilian police officers have been deployed, while another 31 officers are to arrive before the end of March 2003. The officers recruited have been deployed to all Sierra Leone police divisions. At the same time, United Nations mentors are working closely with the Sierra Leone police in the implementation of the local needs policing concept jointly developed with the Commonwealth advisers. This has contributed to a noticeable increase in the confidence of the public in the police throughout the country. The Steering Committee has recently recommended the deployment of 30 more civilian police trainers.

20. Simultaneously, the Sierra Leone police and UNAMSIL are jointly developing a deployment plan aimed at the reinforcement of the police presence, based on risk analysis and policing needs, in areas to be vacated by UNAMSIL during its drawdown. The plan will indicate specific numbers of Sierra Leone police officers to be deployed within each district, supported by an assessment of infrastructure and logistical needs in the various locations, and make reference to the deployment of officers from the Operations Support Division, the armed wing of the Sierra Leone police.

21. The plan obviously has personnel, budgetary and logistical implications that will require close monitoring to ensure that its objectives are met. It hinges in particular on the support that the Sierra Leone police will be able to mobilize to acquire necessary infrastructure and equipment, in particular in terms of mobility and communications.

22. Also, the United Nations policy and planning adviser and chief training adviser have been deployed. A diamond-mining policing adviser, a cross-border policing adviser and an airport policing adviser are being identified to assist the Sierra Leone police in these critical areas.

B. Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces

23. The Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces continue to improve gradually their effectiveness as a result of training and considerable restructuring support from the International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT), led by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The restructuring, which should result in the reduction of the force from its current strength of approximately 14,000 to about 10,500, has commenced. Its Joint Force Command has been restructured into three regionally based brigades, a Freetown garrison and a maritime wing. In an attempt to address infrastructure problems, a short-term initiative to address the barracks shortage currently faced by RSLAF has started, with financial assistance from the United Kingdom. However, with a third of RSLAF troops continually deployed in Sierra Leone-Liberia border areas, their sustainability remains a source of serious concern. Plans are under way to establish permanent garrisons in the heartland from which operational deployments to the border can be mounted. Along with the ongoing restructuring, this is expected to create a more capable, albeit smaller army.

24. The joint UNAMSIL and RSLAF border operations — including helicopter gunship patrols for deterrence — were intensified during the reporting period. On his visit to sector east on 15 February, the UNAMSIL Force Commander observed that the security of the area around Mandavulahun had improved due to the presence of RSLAF and UNAMSIL regular patrols. It was also noted that the refugees

crossing at the Mano River Bridge were being expeditiously processed. The serious logistic and capacity shortfalls of RSLAF and the Sierra Leone police have been ameliorated to some extent by the provision of UNAMSIL helicopters to dispatch their reinforcements in a timely fashion. Also, the two agencies have increasingly been engaged in joint activities in response to the current security concerns in Freetown.

25. Current operations, however, are hindered by the lamentable state of the RSLAF vehicle fleet and the paucity of communications equipment. In a welcome demonstration of support, some 300 British troops arrived in Sierra Leone on 22 February to conduct joint military exercises with RSLAF and to support IMATT. The aim of the deployment is to demonstrate a continued commitment to the peace process in Sierra Leone on the part of the United Kingdom, as well as to provide a valuable training opportunity for both the British troops and RSLAF. The arrival of the force has been received extremely well by the local media and the populace.

26. As I have stressed in my previous reports, the situation at the Liberia border continues to pose a threat to the security and stability of Sierra Leone. During the period under review, in addition to the Mandavulahun village incident described above, raids by armed Liberians searching for food in Sierra Leonean villages continued. With LURD stepping up its campaign in Liberia, there has been an upsurge in the number of military deserters and refugees seeking sanctuary in Sierra Leone. Some 300 members of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) surrendered to RSLAF during the reporting period and are now among other ex-combatants interned at a camp at Mapeh, created and run by the Government to accommodate combatants fleeing from either LURD or Government forces. During the reporting period there have been a number of meetings between RSLAF and Liberian officials in order to exchange information on the situation in the border areas. Sierra Leone officials also had contacts with LURD, encouraging them to commence peace negotiations with the Liberian Government.

V. Peace consolidation

A. Consolidating State authority

27. There has been progress in consolidating State authority throughout the country. The full deployment of Government officials to all districts by March 2003 has almost been completed. Additionally, the process of filling the 61 vacant posts of paramount chiefs, which commenced on 2 December 2002, was successfully concluded on 24 January 2004. In order to promote local governance through decentralization, the Government has begun plans to devolve powers to the districts. A Task Force on Local Government Reform and Decentralization, chaired by the Vice-President, has been established for this purpose and is expected to become operational in March. Elections for new municipal and district councils are planned to take place before the end of the year.

28. The district recovery committees, established to spearhead recovery efforts at the local level, are now operational in most districts. In order to monitor the progress of the recovery efforts on the ground, the National Recovery Committee, involving donors, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, has decided to hold its monthly meetings at the district level.

29. It should be noted, however, that the consolidation of State authority in Sierra Leone is still hampered by major logistic and infrastructural constraints. Many of the returning officials lack the basic facilities for the discharge of their functions. Travel between Freetown and the district headquarters is difficult, particularly during the rainy season. These constraints should be overcome as soon as possible so as to lay a solid foundation for longer-term programmes designed to strengthen local government and encourage decentralization.

B. Reintegration of ex-combatants

30. The Government continues to make progress with the programme to offer reintegration opportunities to registered ex-combatants. The National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration estimates the remaining caseload of those awaiting inclusion in the programme at 14,700. Special attention has recently been given to accelerating programme delivery in critical districts with large outstanding caseloads, including Kailahun, Kono, Bo, Moyamba and Pujehun. The National Committee and its working partners envisage that the reintegration opportunities programme could possibly be completed by the end of 2003.

31. The programme itself remains seriously underfunded. However, considerable support has been received from Japan through recent contributions to the Department for International Development (DFID)-managed community rehabilitation programme and to the United Nations Human Security Fund, managed by UNAMSIL and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). With additional opportunities provided by the German Agency for Technical Cooperation and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in the East, and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in the area of reunification and the reintegration of child ex-combatants, the projected shortfall in the Multi-Donor Trust Fund managed by the World Bank is currently estimated at approximately $6 million.

32. The achievement of the long-term goal of reintegrating ex-combatants into communities will largely depend on prospects for economic recovery. The future of ex-combatants, in this regard, is very much linked to that of other youth in Sierra Leone. Provided that economic recovery can be sustained, youth empowerment and engagement programmes, such as the ones promoted by the National Youth Policy, developed by the Ministry of Youth, have great potential to enhance the stability of the country.

C. Restoration of Government control over diamond mining

33. The restoration of effective Government control over the country's mineral resources, particularly diamond mining, remains an area of critical importance for the future of the country. Despite some progress achieved by the Government in this area, basic concerns of the international community remain. Following the end of the disarmament process, more than 1,000 diamond-mining licences have been issued in 44 chiefdoms. On a positive note, in 2002 official exports of diamonds increased to $41 million, from about $26 million in the preceding year. New diamond deposits have been discovered in Port Loko, Kambia and Kamakwie, and

diamond mining, including mechanized mining, is on the increase. Kimberlite mining is expected to resume in Kono district later in 2003.

34. However, uncontrolled illegal diamond-mining activity in various parts of the country and consequent illicit trade through unofficial channels persist, though no accurate data are available in this regard. In some areas youth groups are seeking to exercise de facto control over mining, in defiance of State authority. Diamond trading is yet to be adequately regulated. These factors constitute a continuing long-term threat, and UNAMSIL remains the principal guarantor of stability in the main diamond-producing areas.

35. The Government of Sierra Leone has launched, with co-financing by UNDP, a Diamonds for Development initiative that is designed to set up community-based projects in diamond-producing chiefdoms with funding from the Diamond Area Community Development Fund, established in 2001. Efforts to contribute to peace and prosperity through community-based initiatives were also spearheaded in Kono with the formation of the Kono Peace Diamond Alliance, with the assistance of USAID.

36. The Government is also pursuing policies aimed at the improvement of the diamond-mining and diamond-marketing sectors. A DFID-sponsored diamond sector policy workshop took place on 5 and 6 March 2003, and addressed the key issues affecting the diamond-mining industry in Sierra Leone, the development and better enforcement of an appropriate legal and regulatory regime and the provision of a fair and efficient enabling business environment. The World Bank and the Government of Sierra Leone have recently concluded a comprehensive analytical study that makes important recommendations for the revival and development of the mining sector.

37. Effective implementation of new policies and strategies for the development of the diamond sector will remain a complex and challenging task, given the history of corruption and poor governance. The Government will have to demonstrate the necessary resolve to reform and regulate this sector. In order to enhance the Government's efforts in curbing illegal mining, UNAMSIL is examining the possibility of offering its assistance, using military observers, to determine the global positioning system coordinates of each of the licenced plots leased for artisanal mining.

D. Promoting human rights, reconciliation and justice

38. During the reporting period, UNAMSIL intensified its human rights monitoring and capacity-building activities. The Mission continues to monitor police stations, prisons and the administration of justice and to provide human rights training for the Sierra Leone police and RSLAF.

39. Extension of judicial coverage constitutes a priority for the Government, especially when the Sierra Leone police are to assume responsibility for law and order in the areas to be vacated by UNAMSIL. The reactivation of the system of justices of the peace by the Government to supplement the work of the magistrates is aimed at addressing the acute personnel constraints in the judicial system. About 70 of the 200 justices of the peace appointed last year completed a three-week intensive training programme jointly organized by the Government and UNDP on 31

January 2003. It is expected that these measures will facilitate the dispensation of justice.

40. The rehabilitation of prisons in various parts of the country is ongoing. The rehabilitation by UNDP of the prisons in Kambia, Makeni and Bo and the increase of prison officers and personnel to 1,140, from the current level of 790, are also under way. These efforts should be seen as an important element in the broader objective of strengthening the rule of law in Sierra Leone, and they require the continuing support and assistance of the international community.

41. The multiple adjournments in the trials of the 34 former West Side Boys, former RUF leader Foday Sankoh and other former RUF members, and their lack of defense counsel, have continued to be a source of serious concern. In January 2003, both cases were adjourned for the eighth time since being transferred to the High Court in April 2002. The failing health of Mr. Sankoh prompted UNAMSIL physicians to examine him last December. On the basis of the examination results, it was recommended that his cell conditions and medical treatments be improved. In this context, my Special Representative met with the Vice-President and encouraged the Government to implement these recommendations.

E. Protection of children

42. The situation of children in Sierra Leone continues to be of critical concern. The National Commission for War-Affected Children, on which the Office of my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, and UNAMSIL had been working with the Government, was inaugurated on 24 February by President Kabbah, during a visit by Mr. Otunnu to the country. The National Commission has received considerable support, including under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Debt Initiative, for programmes for war-affected children, in particular street children. Also, during Mr. Otunnu's visit the Voice of Children, a unique radio project jointly created by the Office of the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict and UNAMSIL, was launched on 25 February. The expansion of the Family Support Unit within the Sierra Leone police is also worth noting. The adoption of a comprehensive Child Rights Bill by Parliament and the reform of the juvenile justice system remain, however, urgent priorities.

43. Within all parts of UNAMSIL, there have been continuing efforts to mainstream protection of children. The training of peacekeeping personnel in the rights and protection of children has been expanded to include the monitoring and reporting of abuses against children.

F. HIV/AIDS

44. UNAMSIL has continued to provide information to its military and civilian personnel about the impact of HIV/AIDS, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1308 (2000). A number of UNAMSIL personnel participated in the training programmes aimed at imparting knowledge of HIV/AIDS issues to the members of the Mission and creating awareness through trained representatives.

G. Truth and Reconciliation Commission

45. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has continued to make progress in its work despite financial constraints. Assisted by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNAMSIL and UNDP, the Commission made considerable progress in the areas of recruitment, management and statement-taking. A new Executive Secretary and other personnel of the secretariat have been appointed. On 17 February, the Commission opened its new office in Freetown.

46. The Commission had collected more than 3,500 statements as of mid-February. It is expected that up to 8,000 statements will be collected by 31 March, when the hearings phase will begin. In January 2003, the Commission carried out an assessment of the ongoing statement-taking exercise. The results were deemed to be promising, with regard to both the quality and the quantity of the statements collected, with some training provided by UNAMSIL. The Commission's strategy for its interaction with special target groups was also further refined.

47. UNAMSIL has also provided the Commission with logistic and technical support. This includes access to transit on UNAMSIL planes and vehicles and the provision of some communications equipment, air conditioners and office supplies, either on loan or on a cost-reimbursable basis. UNAMSIL's Public Information Section has been engaged in a vigorous campaign to raise awareness among the population regarding the activities of the Commission.

H. Special Court

48. During the period under review, the Special Court for Sierra Leone made significant progress in its operations. As noted in paragraph 5 above, on 10 March 2003 the Prosecutor announced the indictments of seven individuals for war crimes, crimes against humanity and violations of international humanitarian law. In early January, the Registry of the Special Court opened its permanent site in Freetown. The Office of the Prosecutor is expected to move to the new site soon. In addition, the Special Court has taken several steps to finalize its organizational structure and to prepare for the beginning of its proceedings. The Witnesses and Victims Support Unit has been established, and preparations are under way to create a defence support section, which will include both Sierra Leonean and international lawyers.

49. The UNAMSIL Human Rights Section has continued to share with the Special Court information it has collected from investigations into past human rights violations and to support the Court investigators in their fieldwork whenever necessary. Collaboration between UNICEF, child protection agencies and the Special Court has also continued.

50. UNAMSIL has been providing substantial security, logistic and technical support to the Special Court on a cost-reimbursable basis. The Mission granted the Court the use of its construction equipment at the Court's permanent site. It assisted the Court in relocating the communications system from the old to the new premises and in the establishment of an independent communications system for the Court at its new site. The UNAMSIL troops assigned to western Freetown have stationed infantry units near the new Court's premises and the Office of the Prosecutor, and have integrated support for the Court into the contingency plans of the rapid response force.

51. Furthermore, to enhance staff security, 24-hour VHF radio access has been established, with direct links to the UNAMSIL Joint Operations Centre and to the United Nations Field Security Office. A joint contingency plan is being developed by the Special Court to integrate emergency response actions with the Field Security Office and UNAMSIL. UNAMSIL continues to make available to the Court the use of its radio and press facilities. The UNAMSIL Public Information Section has stepped up consciousness-raising programmes on the activities of the Court.

VI. Humanitarian, recovery and development challenges

52. There is an emerging consensus among Sierra Leone's international partners on the need for a progressive shift from large-scale relief assistance in the country to recovery and development efforts, as the Government is making progress towards achieving the benchmarks outlined in the National Recovery Strategy. However, a new influx of Liberian refugees proves that Sierra Leone and the subregion continue to face major humanitarian challenges.

53. The renewal of fighting in Liberia has precipitated a new influx of refugees into Sierra Leone. As at 4 March more than 7,800 refugees had been registered crossing into Sierra Leone, but the total number is estimated at more than 9,000. More than 30 per cent of the refugees are arriving across the Mano River Bridge into Gendema, and another 30 per cent through Mano Kpende, but there are seven other principal crossing points. Staff of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are working in close collaboration with the security forces, RSLAF, the Sierra Leone police and UNAMSIL troops to ensure adequate screening of people as they stream over the border. To this end, an inter-agency team was mobilized to respond to the situation on the ground.

54. With UNAMSIL logistic support, refugees are being transported to the Zimmi way station, where immediate assistance is provided, and thereafter to more permanent camp facilities away from the border. Many refugees are, however, reluctant to move away from the border, awaiting family members or preferring to wait until hostilities have ceased. Currently, it appears that there are sufficient resources to cope with the situation, provided, however, there is no further deterioration and the influx does not increase.

55. At the same time, ongoing humanitarian operations in the country may need to be suspended in order to channel resources towards emergency response efforts for Liberian refugees. The civilian members of the families of fleeing AFL personnel (see para. 26 above) are also being taken care of by UNHCR at refugee camps and way stations, and their visits to the Mapeh camp, where AFL and LURD personnel are being interned, will be facilitated.

56. Between December 2002 and January 2003, more than 51,000 displaced Sierra Leoneans have returned to their places of origin, of whom approximately 13,500 have been formally resettled with humanitarian assistance. Following the completion of the resettlement programme for internally displaced persons, all camps for such persons in the provinces have now been closed. The completion of the resettlement programme for internally displaced persons is a significant landmark for Sierra Leone and lays the foundation for recovery at the district level. The challenge now is to build on this foundation and support ongoing recovery and reintegration initiatives. Freetown, however, faces a significant problem of

homelessness, as large numbers of internally displaced persons, provided with the option of transport from UNAMSIL and resettlement packages, decided to stay in the capital. Among those, some 4,000 persons continue to reside in the National Workshop Camp in downtown Freetown.

57. The UNHCR programme for the repatriation of Sierra Leonean refugees from Guinea, Liberia and other countries in the subregion has continued. Small numbers of refugees from countries other than Guinea and Liberia have been transported by air. Road convoys have been operating on a weekly basis from Guinea. Repatriation from Liberia will be resumed shortly. Some 200,000 Sierra Leoneans have so far returned from asylum countries, of whom more than 124,000 benefited from individual assistance from UNHCR.

58. An aid-coordination committee, made up of senior Government ministers, key donors and representatives of non-governmental organizations, has been created to review and assess progress against benchmarks contained in the Consultative Group Framework for Peace, Recovery and Development, agreed in Paris last November. The first assessment indicates that progress has been made towards the benchmarks in a number of areas and that the Government is generally on track to meet the targets, notably in the economic and social sectors.

59. The United Nations country team, together with its partners, is supporting the Government, through the National Recovery Committee, in its efforts to achieve the benchmarks through short- and medium-term programmes of assistance. As already indicated, UNDP provides support aimed at achieving some of the benchmarks in the area of security reform and governance. UNICEF and UNDP provide support for the reintegration of adult and child ex-combatants. UNICEF assists with the rehabilitation of wells in order to increase access to safe drinking water and sanitation, while the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF provide support for immunization services, aimed at increasing the national immunization coverage. UNICEF and the World Bank rehabilitate primary schools and provide teaching materials. UNICEF also assists with complementary rapid education for children who have missed schooling because of the war. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations provides support for quality seed production and the rehabilitation of seed multiplication infrastructure, aimed at increasing rice production.

60. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs continues to coordinate the provision of humanitarian assistance and leads the support for the resettlement of internally displaced persons. WHO, the United Nations Population Fund, UNICEF and the World Bank support awareness programmes and policy formulation on HIV/AIDS. The World Bank provides support in the education, health and economic sectors. While the United Nations country team's short-term programmes are outlined in the 2003 relief and recovery appeal, the longer-term programme is presented in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, which provides a common operational framework for development activities for the period 2004-2007.

61. Economic recovery continued to accelerate during 2002. The principal factors in the expansion of the economy include the quickening pace of resettlement and rehabilitation activities, the freedom of movement of people and goods, the growing consumer and investor confidence and the dynamic growth of donor-financed imports. Production of minerals, agricultural commodities and manufactured goods,

as well as value added by commerce and transportation, all increased substantially, resulting in real growth in gross domestic product in 2002 estimated at close to 7 per cent. Exports rose by two thirds, largely due to an increase of about 64 per cent in diamonds exported via official channels.

62. Thanks mainly to the continuing large inflow of external assistance, imports climbed by about one third, and gross international reserves rose to $76 million in December 2002. The large expansion in the domestic supply of goods and services and the accumulation of international reserves led to an adjustment of the exchange rate. Together with generally sound fiscal and monetary policies, this pushed down the domestic price level by 4 per cent, further increasing real incomes. Despite the recent hike in oil prices, the prospects for a continued strong recovery in 2003 remain favourable, owing in part to the expectation that rutile exports will resume during the second half of 2003.

63. Sierra Leone's debt was also reduced in 2002, with debt relief obtained under the enhanced HIPC Initiative, as well as from the Paris Club. The country's debt service ratio was reduced from 88 per cent in 2001 to 9 per cent in 2002, freeing up considerable resources for poverty-reduction programmes. Sierra Leone should also become eligible for a second year of interim debt relief under the HIPC Initiative in 2003.

64. Progress was also made in advancing key institutional and structural reforms aimed at promoting private sector growth and sustaining high rates of economic growth, such as the establishment of the National Privatization Commission and the National Revenue Authority.

VII. Regional aspects

65. As the conflicts in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia continue, Sierra Leone's peace consolidation efforts are under way in a highly unstable regional environment. While the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire does not have a direct and immediate impact on Sierra Leone, the recent upsurge of fighting in the border counties of Liberia has had serious implications for the security and stability of Sierra Leone.

66. On 28 February 2003, the International Contact Group on Liberia held its second working session at United Nations Headquarters in New York. It urged the Government of Liberia and LURD to enter immediately and without preconditions into negotiations on a ceasefire, as they had committed to do. It also urged both parties to accept Mali as mediator on behalf of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The Contact Group concluded that the conditions for free and fair elections did not exist at present, and urged the Government of Liberia to create such conditions, including a ceasefire, security, national reconciliation, electoral reforms and respect for human rights, before the elections are held.

67. A mediation process is now scheduled to begin in Bamako, Mali, on 10 March, with President Touré serving as mediator on behalf of ECOWAS. I trust that both parties will make full use of this opportunity to ensure that a way forward is found to bring the protracted conflict in Liberia to an end so that peace and security can be restored to the country and to the wider Mano River Union subregion.

VIII. Financial aspects

68. The General Assembly, by its resolution 56/251 B of 27 June 2002, appropriated $669.5 million for the maintenance of UNAMSIL for the period from 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2003. I have also submitted a detailed budget amounting to $520.1 million for the maintenance of the Mission for the 2003-2004 financial period, which is currently before the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the General Assembly for oversight and legislative review and consideration. Therefore, should the Security Council approve my recommendation set out in paragraph 76 below regarding the extension of the mandate of UNAMSIL, the cost of the operation and maintenance of the Mission during the extension period will be limited to resources approved by the General Assembly.

69. As at 31 January 2003, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNAMSIL amounted to $340.1 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $2.2 billion.

IX. Observations

70. My fifteenth report on UNAMSIL presented detailed proposals for the drawdown of the Mission, which is guided by progress in the implementation of the key security benchmark: building up the capacity of the Sierra Leone police and army. Developments over recent months have proved the prudence of pursuing a gradual drawdown of the Mission consistent with progress made in achieving this benchmark. While the efforts of those concerned have gone a long way towards enhancing the capacity and training of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces and of the Sierra Leone police, the first serious challenges posed recently to both security institutions have exposed the existence of considerable shortcomings. It is widely acknowledged that the presence of UNAMSIL gave the general public the confidence that prevented a deterioration of the situation. Clearly, additional efforts will be needed to enhance the capacity of the security sector in Sierra Leone.

71. These developments should not be interpreted to mean that the generally positive security trends in Sierra Leone have suffered a fundamental reversal. Nonetheless, it should be noted that a Government capacity to maintain internal and external security without any assistance from UNAMSIL has yet to be attained. Therefore, a cautious approach to the pace of the drawdown is fully justifiable. In this connection, much still needs to be done to strengthen the presence of the Sierra Leone police in the areas being vacated by UNAMSIL. Of particular importance are the efforts to mobilize the requisite equipment and logistical support for such a deployment, which is lagging behind. I urge the Government and its partners to address on an urgent basis the logistical and infrastructural needs of both the police and RSLAF.

72. At the same time, the continued existence of Civil Defence Force structures is also a source of concern, in spite of the commitment made earlier by the Government to complete its disbandment by the end of January 2003. The existence of the Civil Defence Force structures may undermine not only the credibility of the demobilization process, but also the long-term stability of the country. It may not be a coincidence that in the areas dominated by ex-Civil Defence Force members there

is considerable resistance to full deployment of the Sierra Leone police and armed forces.

73. The commencement of indictments by the Special Court also carries with it considerable security challenges. In this connection, it is important to ensure that the Sierra Leone police and prison authorities have the requisite capacity to ensure secure custody of those apprehended. In addition, there is a need for close coordination between the Special Court and UNAMSIL in the context of the possible impact of the indictments on the overall security situation in the country.

74. A particular challenge for Sierra Leone society and the Government is how to manage the expectations of the country's young people, and in particular to prevent them from feeling a sense of exclusion. Solutions to these issues are complex and will require time, resources and actions ranging from promoting economic revival and education to skills training. An open and sustained dialogue with the young people will also be crucial. I invite the Government and its partners to continue to engage with youth groups and their leaders to better understand and respond to their aspirations.

75. I note with satisfaction further progress made by the Government to restore its effective control over diamond mining, which is an area of vital importance for the future of the country. It is important for the Government — in cooperation with its international partners — to further step up its efforts to fight illegal diamond mining and trade. It is also gratifying that the Government continues to make progress with the programme offering reintegration opportunities to registered ex-combatants; several thousand of them have been able to take advantage of the programme since my sixteenth report. However, the remaining caseload is still considerable. In this context, the United Nations welcomes the intention of the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and donors to complete the reintegration programme by the end of 2003, and calls upon the Sierra Leone partners, whose past efforts in this area were highly commendable, to provide additional contributions to bridge the existing financial shortfall.

76. Given the various internal and external developments in Sierra Leone, I wish to confirm the need for the gradual continued drawdown of UNAMSIL, as proposed in my fifteenth report. I recommend, further, that the Security Council approve the proposals set out in paragraphs 11 to 14 above relating to the drawdown. Accordingly, it is my intention to provide detailed recommendations concerning the planning and implementation of the remaining steps of phases 3 and 4 of the drawdown process in my reports to the Security Council to be submitted before the end of 2003.

77. In these circumstances, I would like to recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNAMSIL for a further period of six months, until 30 September 2003, in order to enable the Mission to continue its implementation.

78. The recent deterioration of the situation in Liberia continues to be worrying. As has often been stated, the security and stability of Sierra Leone cannot be fully ensured while the conflict in Liberia persists. So far, Sierra Leone has been able to cope with the influx of refugees through the immediate intervention of UNHCR, with logistic assistance from UNAMSIL. However, if a greater influx of refugees were to result from the continuing conflict in Liberia, a humanitarian emergency could arise.

79. I therefore reiterate my appeal to the international community to engage constructively in Liberia in order to bring the conflict to an early end. It has been acknowledged that the International Contact Group on Liberia provides the best forum for the international community to find a comprehensive solution to the country's crisis, in addition to contributing to improved relations among the countries of the Mano River Union. The reported involvement of former armed elements from both Liberia and Sierra Leone in the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire is also cause for alarm because of its potential for further regional destabilization.

80. Lastly, I wish to express my appreciation to the Security Council and troop- and police-contributing countries, as well as to ECOWAS and donors, for their continued support for UNAMSIL. I also commend my Special Representative and all UNAMSIL military and civilian personnel for the progress made during the reporting period.

Annex

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone: contributions as at 20 March 2003

Authorized military strength: 15,000 (up to 260 military observers)

	Military observers	*Staff officers*	*Troops*	*Sector headquarters staff*	*Total*
Bangladesh	15	18	2 203	65	2 301
Bolivia	6				6
Canada	5				5
China	6				6
Croatia	10				10
Czech Republic	5				5
Denmark	2				2
Egypt	10				10
Gambia	15				15
Germany			16		16
Ghana	7	12	846	1	866
Guinea	12	5	776		793
Indonesia	10				10
Jordan	10	2	120		132
Kenya	12	13	994		1 019
Kyrgyzstan	2				2
Malaysia	10				10
Mali	7				7
Nepal	10	4	798		812
New Zealand	2				2
Nigeria	9	16	3 095	58	3 178
Pakistan	15	18	3 769	47	3 849
Russian Federation	13	4	110		127
Slovakia	2				2
Sweden	3				3
United Republic of Tanzania	12				12
Thailand	5		5		10
Ukraine	5	5	630		640
United Kingdom	15	7			22
Uruguay	11				11
Zambia	10	6	821	1	838
Total	**256**	**115**	**14 178**	**172**	**14 721**

Force Commander: Kenya; Deputy Force Commander/Chief Military Observer: Pakistan
Authorized strength of civilian police: 170

Civilian police: Bangladesh: 5; Canada: 7; Cameroon: 1; Gambia: 1; Ghana: 3; India: 1; Jordan: 5; Kenya: 5; Malaysia: 5; Nepal: 8; Niger: 2; Nigeria: 2; Norway: 3; Russia: 3; Senegal: 1; Sri Lanka: 5; Sweden: 2; United Republic of Tanzania: 5
Total: 64.

UNAMSIL
Deployment as of March 2003
National capital
Provincial capital
Town, village
International boundary
Provincial boundary
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
GUINEA
LIBERIA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
NORTHERN
SIERRA LEONE
EASTERN
SOUTHERN
Freetown
Makeni
Kenema
Bo
Kabala
Magburaka
Port Loko
Lunsar
Rokel Bridge
Waterloo
Rotifunk
Moyamba
Mile 91
Masiaka
Magbuntoso
Goderich
Wellington
Hastings
Kambia
Rokupr
Forecariah
Fandor
Mamou
Faranah
Medina Oula
Banian
Bambaya
Yombiro
Bendou Bodou
Kurubonla
Kamakwie
Kamalu
Batkanu
Mateboi
Pendembu
Bumbuna
Bendugu
Yomadu
Yengema
Kayima
Tefeya
Masingbi
Tongo
Panguma
Daru
Segbwema
Kailahun
Koidu Sefadu
Kondembu
Sumbuya
Gbangbatok
Sembehun
Sherbro
Bonthe
Pujehun
Zimmi
Kongo
Bendaja
Bopolu
Bomi Hills
Robertsport
Kle
Bong
Yele
Tunge
Mongeri
Taiama
Njala
Mano
Jct
Gorahun
Potoru
Tokpombu
Joru
Mano
Nitti
Kpetewoma
Moseneh
Sierromco
Bumpeh
Taonzo
Lago
Yoni
Tolobo
Gbinti
Mamuka
Babunda
Ribia
Lofa
Mano
Sumbuya
Matru
Kpetewoma
Nitti

United Nations S/2003/321/Corr.1

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 March 2003

Original: English

Seventeenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

Corrigendum

Paragraph 68, last sentence

For paragraph 76 below *read* paragraph 77 below

03-28422 (E) 180303

United Nations S/2003/322

Security Council

Distr.: General
17 March 2003
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 14 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I wish to transmit to you herewith the daily report on the activities carried out by the inspection teams of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq on 14 March 2003.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Aldouri**
Permanent Representative

03-28434 (E) 210303 240303

Annex to the identical letters dated 14 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

Activities of the UNMOVIC and IAEA inspection teams in Iraq

Inspection activities carried out on Friday, 14 March 2003

I. IAEA inspection team

The team left the Canal Hotel at 9.40 a.m. and carried out a motorized radiation survey of the Ubaydi district that included sites belonging to the Ministry of Transport and Communications, military units, industrial areas and residential areas. On completing its mission, which lasted 1 hour and 30 minutes, the team returned to the Canal Hotel.

II. UNMOVIC inspection team (missiles)

Group I

The group left the Canal Hotel at 8.40 a.m. and went to the Technical Battalion in the Taji district. The group oversaw the destruction of four Sumud-2 missiles, seven warheads and 14 fuel tanks. On completing its mission, which lasted 3 hours and 40 minutes, the group returned to the Canal Hotel.

Group II

The group left the Canal Hotel at 8.30 a.m. and went to the Karamah State Company, which belongs to the Military Industrialization Corporation (MIC). The group oversaw the transfer of warheads to the destruction site at Taji and took an inventory of documents relating to the Sumud-2 missile with a view to their destruction. It then inspected the semifinished products warehouse and examined Sumud-1 missile parts and dies. On completing its mission, which lasted 3 hours and 30 minutes, the group returned to the Canal Hotel.

III. UNMOVIC inspection team (chemical)

The team left the Canal Hotel at 10 a.m. and went to the site of the defunct Muthanna Establishment, owned by the Tariq State Company. It oversaw the destruction of some equipment belonging to the site, then inspected the site. On completing its mission, which lasted 1 hour and 30 minutes, the team returned to the Canal Hotel.

IV. UNMOVIC joint inspection team in Mosul

The team left the Nineveh Palace Hotel at 9 a.m. and went to the Sinjar district. It inspected and photographed the destroyed rocket launching base and took

its coordinates. On completing its mission, which lasted 1 hour, the team returned to the Nineveh Palace Hotel.

V. Aerial reconnaissance aircraft

The Mirage IV reconnaissance aircraft entered Iraqi airspace at 1045 hours and reconnoitred a number of areas. It left Iraqi airspace at 1225 hours, following a reconnaissance operation lasting 1 hour and 40 minutes.

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Security Council

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Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 15 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the daily report on the activities carried out by the inspection teams of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq on 15 March 2003 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Aldouri**
Permanent Representative

03-28397 (E) 200303 210303

Annex to the identical letters dated 15 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

Activities of the UNMOVIC and IAEA inspection teams in Iraq

Inspection activities on 15 March 2003

I. IAEA inspection team

Group I

A group of two inspectors left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 9.20 a.m. and travelled to the Dhu al-Fiqar Factory, which belongs to the Military Industrialization Corporation (MIC). On arrival, the inspectors met with the factory manager and discussed with him the new modified form for handling and material balance relating to aluminium delivered to the factory, which must be filled in monthly. The group then toured the various parts of the factory and the warehouse where the aluminium is stored. It then travelled to the Al-Nasr al-Azim Company, where it inspected the scrap metal yard and certain buildings. The mission lasted 4 hours and 15 minutes, after which the group returned to the hotel.

Group II

A second group left the Canal Hotel at 9.15 a.m. to conduct car-borne radiation surveys using portable equipment designed to detect any trace of radioactivity. Measurements were taken on the site of the Ibn Sina State Company, which belongs to MIC, including all of the Company's facilities and the road leading to it. The mission lasted one hour, after which the group returned to the Canal Hotel.

II. UNMOVIC inspection team (missiles)

Group I

Group I left the Canal Hotel at 8.30 a.m. and travelled to the Dhat al-Sawari State Company for Chemical Industries, where the Technical Battalion is stationed. Upon arrival, the inspectors supervised the destruction of three missiles and one launcher, as well as 12 warheads and six propellant tanks. The mission lasted four hours, after which the group returned to the hotel.

Group II

Group II left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 8.30 a.m. and travelled to the Qa'qa' State Company, which belongs to MIC. Upon arrival, they placed thermal covers over the tags on the Samoud 2 missile warheads. The mission lasted 1 hour 15 minutes, after which the group returned to the hotel.

III. UNMOVIC inspection team (chemical)

The group left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 10 a.m. and travelled to the Dawrah oil refinery, which belongs to the Ministry of Petroleum. Upon arrival, the inspectors interviewed the manager of the refinery, requesting explanations for the changes that had taken place in the company since 1998, the type of work done there, its various units, the number of office staff and engineers working for it, the type of metal used in the construction of the refinery towers and the percentage of staff with advanced qualifications. The group then discussed the declarations relating to the refinery and inspected the various parts of the refinery and storage areas. The mission lasted two hours, after which the team returned to the hotel.

IV. UNMOVIC inspection team (biological)

The team left the Canal Hotel at 8.30 a.m. and travelled to the Military Medical Command, which comes under the Ministry of Defence. Upon arrival, the inspectors met with the officer in charge and interviewed him about the site, the activities conducted there, its relationship with military hospitals and Iraqi import agencies, the number of graduates employed, and whether any dual-use products had been present at the site since 1998. The group then inspected all of the storage facilities on the site. The mission lasted three hours, after which the team returned to the hotel.

V. UNMOVIC joint inspection team in Baghdad

At 8.30 a.m. a helicopter carrying the members of the inspection team took off from the Rashid military airfield and flew to the site of the supergun located in the Jabal Hamrin area. Upon arrival, the team inspected the base of the supergun and photographed the reinforced concrete base. The mission lasted 40 minutes, after which the team returned to the hotel.

VI. UNMOVIC joint inspection team in Mosul

The team left the Nineveh Palace Hotel in Mosul at 9 a.m. and travelled to the site of the Saddam Dam project. Upon arrival, the inspectors examined the pumped-storage station and toured the site, the artificial lake behind the dam and the storage areas in their vehicles. The mission lasted two hours, after which the team returned to the Nineveh Palace Hotel.

VII. U-2 reconnaissance aircraft

A U-2 reconnaissance aircraft entered Iraqi airspace at 10.50 a.m., flew over various areas and left at 4.40 p.m. The flight lasted 6 hours 15 minutes.

United Nations S/2003/3

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Identical letters dated 16 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the daily report on the activities carried out by the inspection teams of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq on 16 March 2003.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Aldouri**
Permanent Representative

03-28416 (E) 210303 210303

Annex to the identical letters dated 16 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

Activities of the UNMOVIC and IAEA inspection teams in Iraq

Inspection activities carried out on 16 March 2003

I. UNMOVIC inspection team (missiles)

The team left the Canal Hotel at 8.30 a.m. and travelled to the site in Taji district where the Technical Battalion is stationed. Upon arrival, the inspectors supervised the destruction of Sumud-2 missiles, eight warheads and six tanks of propellant. On completing their assignment, which lasted four hours, the inspectors returned to the Canal Hotel.

II. UNMOVIC inspection team (biological)

1. **Group 1**: the group left the Canal Hotel at 8.40 a.m. and travelled to the Karbala Technical Institute, affiliated with the Military Industrialization Corporation (MIC). Upon arrival, the inspectors met with the Dean of the Institute and requested explanations regarding the number of departments, the number of teachers with university degrees, the number of students, the number of scientific laboratories, the nature of the work carried out there and the links between the Institute and other Iraqi colleges. The group went on to inspect all the Institute's departments and then travelled to the Institute for Thoracic and Respiratory Diseases, also located in Karbala, which forms part of the health services of Karbala governorate. The inspectors met with the Director of the Institute and asked him about the work of the Institute, the number of diseases diagnosed and the number of patients treated. The group then inspected all the Institute's departments. After completing its assignment, which lasted three hours, the group returned to the Canal Hotel.

2. **Group 2**: the group left the Canal Hotel at 8.40 a.m. and travelled to the bomb destruction site situated in the Aziziyah area. Upon arrival at the site, the inspectors supervised the excavation operations and examined the recently discovered bombs. They then went to the Military Medical Command warehouse, which belongs to the Ministry of Defence, and carefully inspected then photographed the tagged equipment stored there. After completing its assignment, which lasted four hours, the group returned to the Canal Hotel.

III. UNMOVIC joint inspection team in Baghdad

At 8.30 a.m., a helicopter took off from the Rashid airfield for the [illegible] Defence Missile Unit in Habbaniyah, which belongs to the Ministry of Defence. Upon arrival, the inspectors met with the site commander and asked him questions about the number of warehouses and the number and type of missiles stored there. They then inspected several warehouses. After completing its assignment, which lasted one hour, the team returned to the Rashid airfield.

United Nations S/2003/325

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 March 2003
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 18 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a letter dated 18 March 2003 from Mr. Naji Sabri, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning the withdrawal of United Nations staff from Iraq.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Aldouri**
Permanent Representative

03-28723 (E) 190303 190303

Annex to the identical letters dated 18 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I am writing in reference to the resounding failure of the American Administration of Evil to obtain the passage of a hostile, colonialist war draft in the Security Council and its clear lack of success in obtaining international cover for the aggression which it is plotting against Iraq. Indeed, not only did the Security Council reject the American and British draft resolution for a colonialist war; the entire international community also rejected the American colonialist war policy against Iraq.

To offset this ignominious defeat, the American Administration of Evil resorted to exerting pressure on the United Nations to adopt a decision to withdraw all international staff working in Iraq on the pretext that their lives will be threatened if the United States carries out its aggression against Iraq. The Secretariat of the United Nations ought to have informed the United States that such aggression is unlawful and would endanger the lives of 26 million Iraqis and approximately 1,500 international civil servants working in Iraq. It ought to have called upon the Security Council to reject the pressure by the United States as detracting from the credibility of the United Nations, rather than acquiescing to the withdrawal of international civil servants, thus shirking the responsibilities of the United Nations under its Charter and going against the opinion of both the States and the peoples of the international community, who oppose such aggression. As a result of that decision, all United Nations activities in Iraq came to a halt on the evening of 17 March 2003 without any legitimate reason and in violation of the fundamental principles and raison d'être of the United Nations and the resolutions adopted for starting and terminating its activities.

The Secretariat of the United Nations has withdrawn the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), the mission charged with observing the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait. Its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), was "... to deter violations of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of the demilitarized zone and to observe any hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the territory of one State against the other". That measure will make it easier for the American aggressors to wage their aggression against Iraq from Kuwait.

The United States also applied pressure to compel the Secretariat to withdraw all the staff of the United Nations programme for the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding between Iraq and the United Nations (the oil-for-food programme). As from 17 March 2003 the programme stopped attending to the basic humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, thus adding to the suffering of that people caused by 13 long years of sanctions and past American acts of aggression and likely to result in the future from the destruction of basic life structures in Iraq that will be brought by far-reaching American hostilities. Stopping the humanitarian programme means stopping the supply to Iraq of medicine, food and other basic humanitarian necessities paid for entirely out of its own funds. The supply of some 10.5 million dollars worth of humanitarian goods paid for solely with Iraqi funds has been stopped as a consequence of the Secretariat's decision to withdraw the staff of the Iraq Programme in violation of Security Council resolution 987 (1995) and the 1996 Memorandum of Understanding between Iraq and the United Nations.

The Secretariat has also pulled out of Iraq the inspection teams of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose work over the past three and one half months has demonstrated the untruth of the American and British claims that proscribed weapons and activities exist in Iraq. The presence of the teams became burdensome to the United States because they brought shame on the evil American Administration, laying bare its allegations and false documents. The withdrawal of the inspection teams violates Security Council resolutions 1441 (2002), 1284 (1999) and 687 (1991) and other relevant Security Council resolutions and signifies that the United Nations Secretariat has failed to comply with the will of the international community to continue the inspections with a view to meeting the requirements of the Security Council resolutions, first and foremost by lifting the tyrannical sanctions against Iraq and by freeing the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction, in particular those possessed by Israel.

In addition, the Secretariat of the United Nations has decided to stop the work of all United Nations specialized agencies in Iraq connected with cooperation agreements with the Iraqi side in the fields of health, education, relief, preservation of the environment and other humanitarian activities, and has withdrawn their staffs. Such a measure violates the principles and objectives of international economic and social cooperation referred to in Chapter IX of the Charter of the United Nations, and specifically the objective set forth in paragraph 55 of the Charter, which calls for "higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development".

What this ultimately means is that the unfortunate measures adopted by the United Nations due to the pressure of American extortion are totally out of keeping with the responsibilities of the United Nations in the area of prevention of aggression, maintenance of international peace and security, development of friendly relations among nations and promotion of economic and social progress and development, nor are they in keeping with the desire of the international community, expressed by the vast majority of the States Members of the United Nations, for the inspections to continue. These measures, therefore, have clearly made the Secretariat a tool for facilitating the aggressive designs of the United States that were rejected by the Security Council and by the vast majority of the countries of the world. Thus the United Nations has slipped further and further into the moral impasse from which it has suffered for the past 13 years, i.e. since it began to impose sanctions unprecedented in history for their inhumanity, savagery and cruelty, their all-inclusiveness and their violation of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

We hope that the Secretariat of the United Nations will shoulder its responsibilities under the Charter, return the United Nations staff members to Iraq and compel the United States to assume responsibility for any threat to which such staff might be subject during the performance of their duties in Iraq. We further hope that the States Members of the United Nations and the international community will reject the measures that have been imposed on the United Nations Secretariat by the United States in an attempt to compensate for falling flat in its effort to rally international support for its hostile intentions.

(*Signed*) Naji **Sabri**
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq

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General Assembly
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Fifty-eighth year

Identical letters dated 17 March 2003 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

The vicious military campaign being carried out by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, continues to widen and intensify, claiming even more human lives in its wake. Palestinian cities, towns, villages and refugee camps continue to be targeted by the Israeli occupying forces, which routinely launch raids and attacks, using excessive and indiscriminate force against the defenceless Palestinian civilian population. Every day that passes witnesses more death, more destruction and the ongoing devastation of Palestinian society in all its aspects as the occupying Power continues to pursue this campaign of war crimes, State terrorism and systematic human rights violations against the Palestinian people.

In the 10 days since our last letter, the Israeli occupying forces have killed at least 41 Palestinians, including children, and killed one foreign national (American). Many other Palestinians have been wounded, several of them critically, during recent attacks by the occupying forces. In addition to the extrajudicial executions being regularly committed by the Israeli occupying forces against targeted Palestinians, the occupying forces continue to wilfully kill civilians through the use of excessive and indiscriminate force against the Palestinian population under occupation. An extreme illustration of such excessive and indiscriminate use of force and the occupying forces' shoot-to-kill policy occurred this past week, on Thursday, 13 March, when Israeli troops unleashed a barrage of machine gun and helicopter fire on two men on a road near Hebron, riddling their car with bullets and killing both of them. The two men killed were in fact Israeli soldiers, whom the occupying forces stated they had "mistaken" for Palestinians. Indeed, without provocation, without reason, without questions, the occupying forces shot at the men, intending to kill them and proving once again how lax the occupying Power's firing regulations are and how instituted the policy of wilful killing of Palestinians has become among the Israeli occupying forces.

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During this same period, dozens of Palestinian homes have been deliberately demolished by the occupying forces, leaving hundreds of Palestinians homeless, and dozens of other Palestinian homes and shelters have been damaged, many severely, by the occupying forces during their assaults. Moreover, the occupying forces continue to carry out raids and searches of homes and round-ups, while at the same time abducting, arresting and detaining Palestinians throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In less than two weeks, more than 100 Palestinians, including many from the Jenin, Nablus, Al-Khalil and Gaza City areas, have been detained by the Israeli occupying forces. These people are now being held illegally by the occupying Power, in addition to the more than 5,000 Palestinians being held in Israeli jails and detention centres, including nearly 65 Palestinian women.

With regard to the recent killings committed, just today, 17 March, the Israeli occupying forces, in two different assaults in the Gaza Strip, killed 10 Palestinians, among them a two-year-old girl, Hanan Ziyad Al-Asar, and two other Palestinian children, and killed 2 Palestinians in the Tulkarem area. In Gaza, early in the morning (Palestine time), Israeli tanks and armoured vehicles, backed by helicopter gunships, raided the densely populated Nusseirat refugee camp, killing at least seven people and wounding several others. A number of Palestinian homes were also blown up by the occupying forces during this assault. Later on the same day, the Israeli occupying forces raided the town of Beit Lahiya, firing indiscriminately in the area as children were going to school and killing three Palestinians. In addition, the occupying forces rounded up hundreds of residents of Beit Lahiya for questioning.

These brutal, wilful killings come on the heels of recent attacks launched by the occupying forces in the same area as well as in other areas that have killed many Palestinians. In this regard, last week, in less than 24 hours, the Israeli occupying forces killed 11 Palestinians in the Jenin area. On Thursday, 13 March, the occupying forces attacked the village of Tamoun near the city of Jenin, killing 5 Palestinians. The following day, the occupying forces launched yet another raid in the Jenin refugee camp, killing 6 Palestinians and causing extensive damage. Further, in an attack committed earlier in the week, Israeli occupying forces killed another Palestinian during a home demolition in Gaza. Indeed, the occupying Power's illegal practice of home demolitions has not only left thousands homeless but has also been a lethal practice that has claimed the lives of many. As such, the immense bulldozers being used by the Israeli occupying forces to raze and destroy Palestinian homes, lands and infrastructure represent yet another deadly weapon in Israel's vast military arsenal.

Regrettably, it is not only the Palestinian people that have suffered grave loss under the treads and plows of Israel's mighty bulldozers. Yesterday, 16 March, in a horrific act of wilful killing, an Israeli bulldozer ran over and killed a 23-year-old American woman, Rachel Corrie, during a home demolition in Rafah in the Gaza Strip. Ms. Corrie was among a group of activists with the International Solidarity Movement (ISM), who were protesting the home demolitions being carried out by the occupying forces. The ISM activists have repeatedly and voluntarily participated in such protests and non-violent demonstrations throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, trying to provide assistance and protection to the Palestinian civilian population facing Israel's relentless military onslaught. Ms. Corrie's tragic death provides even further proof of the excessive and indiscriminate force being used by the occupying Power against civilians. In this regard, Israeli claims that the driver of

the bulldozer did not see Ms. Corrie have been refuted by several witnesses, who stated that not only was she visible in a bright orange jacket, but that, using a megaphone, she had been speaking to the driver for several minutes prior to him running her over with the bulldozer's huge plow and treads.

Ms. Corrie's killing by the Israeli occupying forces should be firmly condemned by the international community. Failure to do so will only further sanction the impunity with which Israel, the occupying Power, has been feverishly carrying out its bloody and brutal campaign throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. Indeed, such wilful killing of a civilian is a war crime, and the perpetrators of this crime must be held accountable and brought to justice.

This letter is in follow-up to our previous 161 letters to you regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2001/921) to 7 March 2003 (A/ES-10/221-S/2003/287), constitute a basic record of the crimes committed by the Israeli occupying forces against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all these war crimes, State terrorism and systematic human rights violations committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

Accordingly, in follow-up to the above-mentioned letters, it is my deep regret to inform you that, since our last letter to you, the Israeli occupying forces have killed at least 41 Palestinians, including children, raising the total number of martyrs to 2,265 Palestinians. (The names of the martyrs that have been identified thus far are contained in the annex to the present letter.)

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nasser **Al-Kidwa**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

Annex to the identical letters dated 17 March 2003 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Names of martyrs killed by the Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem*

(Saturday, 8 March to Monday, 17 March 2003)

Saturday, 8 March 2003

1. Ibrahim Ahmed Khaled Al-Makadmeh
2. Ala'a Odeh Al-Shukri
3. Khaled Hassan Juma'a
4. Abdelrahman Zuhair Al-Amoudi
5. Mahmoud Hassan Al-Zinati
6. Mufeed Saed Al-Daefi

Sunday, 9 March 2003

Ribhi Mahmoud Abdelraziq Obeid

Tuesday, 11 March 2003

1. Imad Hussein Abu Gharkoud
2. Mohammed Ismail Ayash
3. Nidal Ibrahim Abu Saqr
4. Hafez Najmy Al-Rajbi
5. Jabr Jaber Joubran

Wednesday, 12 March 2003

Rami Taleb Saed Al-Ashqar

Thursday, 13 March 2003

1. Samir Saleh Mahra (from wounds sustained earlier)
2. Baker Nayef Attiyeh Bani Odeh
3. Imad Nayef Attiyeh Bani Odeh
4. Sami Fathi Mustafa Basharat
5. Amin Ali Sa'ad Basharat (18 years old)
6. Mohammed Ghazi Abu Murad Mahajneh

* The total number of Palestinians killed by the Israeli occupying forces since 28 September 2000 is 2,265 martyrs.

Friday, 14 March 2003

1. Yussef Ahmed Hassan Musharqeh
2. Wathiq Ahmed Al-Bash Ighbaryeh
3. Rabea' Farah Hasan Sharkawi
4. Osama Ribhi Saed Abu Khalil (15 years old)
5. Ibrahim Khalil Minizil
6. Saleh Adeeb Bu'atewi (from wounds sustained earlier)
7. Jihad Samir Abu Rabea' (17 years old)
8. Mohammed Nizar Ibrahim Selim (17 years old)

Sunday, 16 March 2003

1. Ahmed Mahmoud Al-Najjar
2. Mohammed Issa Abdelhady

Monday, 17 March 2003

1. Hanan Ziyad Al-Asar (2 years old)
2. Omar Hassan Darwish (13 years old)
3. Omar Tawfiq Abu Yussef (16 years old)
4. Iyad Bashir Azreeq
5. Ibrahim Yussef Al-Othmani
6. Saed Hosni Al-Taweel
7. Mohammed Rajeb Al-Safeen
8. Ramzi Al-Sudoodi
9. Shadi Kharees
10. Ala'a Al-Kahlousa
11. Muaed Ahmed Al-Ashqar
12. Samer Riyad Mohammed Al-Ashqar